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In an effort to control rampant hospital-cost
inflation, Congress passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982 and the Social Security
Amendments of 1983. The result of these two initiatives
is the implementation of a prospective payment system
(PPS) that uses diagnosis related groups (DRGs) in
classifying patients and reimbursing hospitals for
Medicare patients. Using the Health Care Financing
Administration's (HCFA) methods (i.e., rates, weights and
ICD-9-CM DRGs) for determining reimbursable amounts, this
analysis examines the postulation that the typical U.S.
naval hospital--if reimbursed for actual inpatient
workload--would have received more than its incurred
expenses. Data for three naval hospitals over a two-year
period (FY83 and FY84) are used. Findings of this
analysis suggest that on the average the typical naval
hospital would have been reimbursed 32 percent more than
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On 1 October 1983, the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) , which is part of the Department of
Human and Health Services, implemented a prospective
prospective payment system (PPS) that uses diagnosis
related groups (DRGs) to reimburse civilian hospitals for
treating inpatients under Medicare. Historically,
hospital-cost inf-lation has run much higher than general
inflation; yet tentative findings indicate use of DRGs may
be slowing this growth. In the future, a hospital's
financial well-being will be directly tied to its ability
to contain costs. In the civilian health care sector
emphasis appears to be shifting from retrospective,
cost-pass-through methods to one of prospective, fixed
cost based on specific case mixes. This emphasis on PPS
using DRGs is part of the strategy to design better
management/financial control subsystems into the overall
health care delivery system, providing incentives for its
participants (physicians, administrators, trustees, and
staff personnel alike) to provide more efficient care.
Diagnosis related groups are part of a patient
classification system that uses 470 case-mix groupings,
which are largely based on various characteristics that
13
are statistically homogeneous. As a measurement of output
or surrogate of efficiency, the DRG patient classification
system comes considerably closer to assessing the true
nature of a hospital's product than any other proxy used
today. For the first time, DRGs enable measuring the
output of hospitals by grouping various hospital services
into product groups. Moreover, DRGs permit hospitals to
identify DRGs that are profitable (revenues exceed related
expenses), and conversely, categories or case-mix
groupings that are unprofitable (i.e., are more of an
expense center product than a profit center) by employing
the concept of case-mix accounting.
As an extension of this capability, this thesis
investigates and analyzes what three typical naval
hospitals would have received had they been reimbursed
under Medicare's DRG and PPS reimbursement methods, as
contained in Public Law 98-21.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The objectives of this research effort are twofold.
First, the authors want to determine whether a feasible
and meaningful comparison of inpatient care costs can be
made between civilian and naval treatment facilities
(NTFs) using DRGs. Second, if possible, we would like to
develop an algorithm or model that enables comparison
between what the typical NTFs would have received under
14
Medicare's prospective reimbursement scheme and what these
NTFs actually expended for specific inpatient workloads.
Actual workload data for two fiscal years will be used to
make the comparison.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The research hypothesis is: NTFs' inpatient operating
expenses are less than the reimbursement levels these
naval hospitals would have received under the provisions
of Public Law 98-21. If true, this would imply that NTFs
are efficient when judged by this private sector standard.
Secondary questions are:
1. Will the uniqueness of the U.S. Naval Medical
Command's NTFs prevent a meaningful comparison
between themselves and Medicare's reimbursement
scheme?
2. If the Veterans Administration's average adjusted
cost per discharge, HCFA cost weights, and DRGs
are used for determining reimbursement amounts
will NTFs' actual inpatient operating expenses be
less than the VA constructed reimbursement level.
3. Are NTFs' thirty most frequent DRGs similar in
each facility and among NTFs from one year to the
next? and are the NTFs' thirty most frequent DRGs
similar to those in California?
4. If NTFs' inpatient care costs are lower than
Medicare's reimbursement amounts, what exactly
does this suggest?
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research methods employed by the authors include
the gathering of information from the most current and
relevant literature, and telephonic and personal
15
interviews. In an effort to gain insight into the Naval
Medical Command's perspective on the role of efficiency
and current methods used to assess efficiency, the authors
personally interviewed the: (1) Surgeon General of the
Navy, (2) Commander, Naval Medical Command, (3) Commander,
Naval Medical Command, National Capital Region, (4)
Director, Research Department, Naval School of Health
Sciences, and (5) various personnel within NAVMEDCOM Codes
13 and 14, who provided the cost accounting reporting
documents. Literature was obtained from the Naval
Postgraduate School Library, Defense Logistics Studies
Information Exchange, Dialog Information Services,
California's Mid-Coast Health Systems Agency, and
applicable regulations, directives, and instructions that
govern DOD's cost accounting reporting system. Extensive
telephonic discussions were conducted with the Tri-Service
DRG Study Group at the U.S. Army Health Care Studies and
Clinical Investigation Activity in obtaining biometric
data. Information and data gathered from the above
sources were used to analyze how DRGs were being employed
by the civilian health care sector and how best our
proposed analysis could and should be conducted.
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This analysis examines the development,
implementation, and controversy of DRGs, their potential
16
role in controlling hospital costs, and, most importantly,
how HCFA's (or Medicare's) DRGs can be utilized in
assessing the relative efficiency of NTFs. Accordingly,
this thesis limits the discussion to only those parts of
the DOD cost accounting reporting system that pertain
directly to or in understanding the foundation of the
analysis. The thesis does not address all the nuances
HCFA used in formulating DRG groupings, the esoteric
literature findings that pertain to current DRG research,
or any particulars of the personal interviews. Essen-
tially, only information that is relevant and valid to the
analysis, itself, and to understanding DRGs and the cost
reporting system is provided. The intended audience of
this thesis are those who have a basic familiarity of the
civilian and U.S. Navy's health care system but who are
not necessarily familiar with DOD ' s cost accounting
systems or provisions of Public Law 98-21.
Since the biometric data for FY85 were replete with
inaccurate and incomplete data, the authors elected to use
only two fiscal years of data for comparative purposes.
Although they used only the most accurate and best
available data for this analysis, the authors were by
necessity limited to a small sample population of three
NTFs. Therefore, the findings are at best preliminary and
should be cautiously interpreted.
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F. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
The organization of the thesis is designed to present
a logical progression toward a comprehensive understanding
of DRGs, a basic understanding of the DOD cost accounting
reporting system, and specifically, why and how our
analysis is formulated. Chapter II presents a wide range
of information, varying from a conceptual discussion of
the factors behind cost containment and hospital-base
inflation to a discussion of the perceived pros and cons
of DRGs. Chapter III describes the prospective payment
system under Public Law 98-21 and DOD's cost accounting
reporting system as it is used in military treatment
facilities. Chapter IV contains as in-depth discussion of
the data, research methodology, and findings of the
analysis. Chapter V discusses the conclusions drawn from




A. COST CONTAINMENT INITIATIVES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
HOSPITAL-BASE INFLATION
The health care field over the last several decades
has experienced rising costs, particularly when con-
trasted with other sections and components of the
economy. In 1983, the nation spent $147 billion for
hospital care compared to $39 billion in 1972— an
increase of 277 percent. During this same ten-year
period, per capita costs for hospital care rose from $179
to $604. Today, 11 percent of the Gross National Product
is comprised of hospital and health care services. Of
this 11 percent more than 4.5 percent is devoted solely
to hospital expenditures and, by 1990, it is estimated
that hospital expenditures alone will be $304 billion.
[Ref. l:p. 5]
Hospital administrators, physicians, third party
payers, and numerous regulatory and governmental agencies
have all tried to control these escalating hospital costs
through a wide range of initiatives and cost containment
measures: (1) health planning (i.e., comprehensive health
planning and health systems agencies) ; (2) professional
standards review organizations (PSROs) ; (3) health
maintenance organizations (HMOs); and (4) cost sharing by
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third party payers [Ref. 2:p. 3]. In large part, these
initiatives have at best met with only limited success.
This remains true today because the design of the health
care delivery system fails to provide the necessary and
holistic incentives in the hospitals' structure and
process.
But before analyzing the hospitals* incentive design
systems and related management control systems using DRGs
and PPS, let us first examine the factors responsible for
the significant increases in hospital cost. One method
of examination involves disaggregating expenditures into
broad categories [Ref. 3:p.4]. In their book, Planning
and Internal Control Under Prospective Payment , Broyles
and Rosko discuss how Freeland and Schendler use disag-
gregating expenditures to establish general patterns of
care. For the period 1971-1981, Freeland and Schendler
identify factors that comprise hospital expenditures
(with the relative importance of each in parentheses) :
general inflation (51.7%), growth in real services per
visit (20.8 %), medical price increases relative to
general price inflation (11.7%), growth in per capita
visits (8.6%), and aggregate population growth (7.2%).
As depicted in Figure 2-1, Freeland and Schendler
disaggregate hospital inpatient care in a similar manner










Source: Mark S. Freeland and Carol Ellen Schendler, "Health Spending in the 1980s: Integration of
Clinical Practice Patterns with Management, " Health Care Financing Review
. vol. 5, (Spring 1984),
Figure 5.
Percent Distribution of Factors Accounting for the Growth of
Expenditures for Community Hospital inpatient Care, 1972-1982
Figure 2-1
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Essentially there are three factors that affect
aggregate expenditure for hospital care: unit price,
quantity, and quality [Ref. l:p. 6]. If one of these
factors increases, while the others are held constant,
the total expenditure will likewise increase.
Although 64.9 percent of the increase in hospital
inpatient cost is attributable to inflation, ("GNP
Deflator" plus "Hospital Input Price in Excess of
Deflator") only 13 percent of it is hospital-specific
related. The significance of this finding is that
overall hospital costs (unit prices) are markedly
affected by the general economy.
The second factor affecting hospital expenditure is
quantity. During the period 1972-1982, both population
and per capita admissions increased. The total U.S.
population increased by 10.7 percent, which caused a 6.9
percent increase in hospital expenditure. Admissions
also increased for two reasons: (1) patients are more
knowledgeable and demanding, requiring physicians to
practice defensively, and (2) the percentage of elderly
in the total population grew concomitantly with an
increase in the use of hospital-based care. This latter
fact portends an even greater proportional increase in
the hospital inpatient costs because of the number of
persons 65 years and over is projected to increase 16
22
percent between 1983 and 1990— including a 22 percent
rise in the number of persons over 74 years. [Ref. l:p.
8]
The third factor affecting aggregate expenditures for
hospital inpatient care is quality. It is assumed that
higher quality of care only comes with increased costs.
This fact has not been necessarily supported by relevant
literature. Over this ten-year period, the number of
full-time equivalent employees has increased approxi-
mately 22 percent. However, one cannot equate this
increase with a corresponding increase in the quality of
care. What is important is that the continual demand or
insistence for improved quality will probably mean an
even greater intensity level per admission, and, there-
fore, higher hospital costs.
Even though the factors of unit price, quantity, and
quality help to explain what has happened and the ordinal
relationship of these factors to one another, they fail
to explain why.
Another method in evaluating the causes of hospital
inflation uses economic analysis based on two predominant
theories to answer why; these are the "cost-push" model
and the "demand-pull" model [Ref. 3:p. 5]. As depicted
in Figure 2-2, one can see using the "cost-push" model
that this supply-side model has had a shifting of the
supply curve from SI to S2 as direct result of the causes
23
Panel A: Cost-Push Inflation
Price




Causes of cost-push inflation
• increased prices for factors of
production
• iicreased full-time equivalent employee
(FTE)/patient ratio
• expensive new technology
• costs of regulatory compliance
• lagging labor productivity




Causes of demand-pull inflation
• increase in general population
• increase in elderly population
• increase in income
• defensive medicine
• availability of new services
• growth of public and private
health insurance
Source : Adapted from Planning and Internal Control Under Prospective
Payment by R V. Broyles and M D Rosko (Rockville:
Aspen Publishers) 1985
Causes of Hospital Cost Inflation
Figure 2-2
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listed in Panel C. Similarly, using the "demand-pull"
model, one can see the demand curve for hospital
services shifting from Dl to D2. Together these models
help explain why prices for hospital services have
steadily increased over the last ten to twenty years.
The "common thread" to both models/theories lies in the
cost-based hospital reimbursement methods, which have
been done largely on a retrospective, cost pass-through
basis without any price rationing incentives for the
consumer or the provider [Ref. 3:p. 7]. These models and
the listed causes of inflation should help to illustrate
why inflationary costs for hospital-based care might
continue to outpace the general economy in the years
ahead unless some mechanism is put in place to contain
costs. This mechanism may well be DRG-based measurement
under a PPS.
B. RETROSPECTIVE VERSUS PROSPECTIVE REIMBURSEMENT OR
EFFECTIVENESS VERSUS EFFICIENCY
Before discussing the development or evolution of
DRGs and case-mix measures let us briefly examine first
the differences between retrospective reimbursement and
prospective reimbursement.
Both terms— retrospective and prospective reimburse-
ment—are used in conjunction with rate-setting programs
under either a governmental program or a third party
payer program, such as the pre-1983 Medicare and Blue
25
Cross/Blue Shield programs, respectively. Under retro-
spective reimbursement hospitals are reimbursed after the
services are rendered and costs are incurred. Hospitals
are given interim payments throughout the year; at the
end of the payment year, a complete review is conducted
on the costs incurred and services rendered with a final
adjustment made for the differences between approved
costs/services and payments already made. Inherent with
a retrospective payment system is the design incentive to
spend as much as the hospital feels is appropriate. [Ref.
l:p. 10] Therefore, the reimbursement system and
financial management control systems are largely driven
by effectiveness rather than efficiency.
As a rate-setting mechanism, prospective reimburse-
ment essentially preapproves anticipated services and
costs, paying in advance a payment based on the expected
case-mix workload. At the end of the year nominal
adjustments are made to ensure hospitals and third party
payers receive an equitable adjustment. Unlike retro-
spective reimbursement, the prospective payment system
gives hospitals incentives to be frugal and cautious in
the pursuit of their programs and objectives. The
underlying design incentive then is to meet an
effectiveness level--be it a "high level of quality"
and/or provision of certain programs—while concomitantly
26
meeting funding constraints imposed by case-mix reim-
bursement. If a hospital provides inpatient care for
less than its costs then the hospital ostensibly stands
to make a profit. With the prospective payment system
the emphasis appears to shift from the effectiveness
model to one driven more by efficiency.
C. CASE-MIX MEASURES, COSTS, ACCOUNTING, AND BUDGETING
Before specifically discussing DRGs, it is important
to understand the concept of how different patient case
mixes can directly affect a hospital's costs. All other
things equal and hospitals have an increase in the
inpatient workload, costs will similarly increase;
however, it is possible for hospitals to have an
increased inpatient workload yet experience lower total
costs. Conversely, hospitals can have a decreased
workload and experience higher total costs. The explana-
tion for this disparity in cost revolves around the
issues of intensity of services and complexity of care
rendered or, in other words, case mix. The issue of
complexity relates to the types of services; whereas,
intensity relates to the number of services per patient
day or hospital stay [Ref. l:p. 21]. As Grimaldi and
Micheletti point out, there is no precise consensus on
what comprises complexity. Certainly there are at least
these five relevant factors: ". . . severity of an
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illness, the prognosis or likely outcome of an illness,
the difficulty of treating the case, the need for timely
intervention, and the amount and composition of resources
used to treat the patient." [Ref. l:p. 64] Again, the
important point is that case complexity and intensity of
service are the two key components of case mix.
Health care researchers, analysts, and hospital
administrators alike acknowledge that historical methods
of measuring ou tput--thr ough such surrogates as
departmental inpatient bed days and number of admissions-
-fail to accurately capture the relationship between
services provided and the costs incurred. That is,
traditional output proxies are poor for purposes of
assessing and monitoring the relationship between
input— manpower, technology, facilities, and
equipment— and output, patient care through hospital
services. Accordingly, traditional managerial accounting
systems are inadequate since they tend to reflect data
and information in the aggregate and on a departmental
level with no accountability for individual patients
being financially managed [Ref. 4:p. 56].
Under the traditional organizational structure of
hospitals, departments are not required to ensure that
individual patients are both efficiently and effectively
managed. Hospital structures that use the case-mix
accounting and budgeting process have an integrated
28
picture of the financial consequences of providing
inpatient care to individual patients in each of the
DRGs, as Figure 2-3 represents. This type of process
enables hospitals to gain an understanding in detail of
the "profile of service requirements" and costs per
patient grouped into product lines. To achieve this,
three inputs are required [Ref. 5:p. 51]:
. Patient clinical data must be sufficient to
determine DRG assignment;
. A "bill of particulars" is needed that describes
specific diagnostic and therapeutic services deliv-
ered to each patient; and
. Detailed costs per unit of service (laboratory,
radiology, dietary, etc.) must be developed based
on whatever are deemed to be appropriate defini-
tions of such services.
As will be discussed in the section on product defini-
tion, hospitals that are organized in a matrix-type
manner will possess the capabilities to use the case-mix
accounting and budgeting concept in its fullest applica-
tion.
Although case-mix measures appear to provide a better
method for assessing, monitoring, and evaluating input-
output relationships than these historical methods, there
is lack of consensus on which grouping strategy or
patient classification system using case mix is optimal
(e. g., DRGs, John Hopkins Severity Score, Systemetrics
Disease Staging, Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania










































Source : Robert B. Fetter and Jean L. Freeman, "Diagnosis Related Groups : Product
Management within Hospitals." Academu of Management Review . 1986, vol. 1 1
,
no.1 , Figure 1
Overview of Case Mix Cost Accounting Process
Figure 2-3
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There is agreement then that patients 1 clinical require-
ments greatly affect costs but there appears to be a
disagreement on precisely what factors best explain this
variation in cost or length of stay. Even though the
state of development of a optimal case-mix grouping
technique is in flux there is agreement that whatever
case-mix method (patient classification system) is
finally accepted it should contain these properties
[Ref . l:p. 22]
:
.
be derived from a reliable and readily available
source,
. be calculated in manner that would preclude
spurious manipulation to suit one's purpose,
. be accepted by physicians and understood by
hospital personnel, and
. be cost beneficial (i.e., the benefits outweigh the
costs) .
When hospitals use case-mix measurements and account-
ing techniques, it enables them to produce more actual
and accurate management information. Case-mix approach
to controlling hospital costs ". . . provides a clear,
complete picture of the costs of treating individual
patients grouped into similar case classes based on use
of resources to set norms and standards for a management
control system" [Ref. 4:p. 57]. This approach, as such,
is based on DRGs, which classifies cases into groups and
thus groups into hospital products that use similar
31
amounts of services and resultant resources [Ref. 6:p.
240] .
As Collins points out, the key issue with the
hospital management control system using case-mix methods
is to motivate physicians to use resources in an economi-
cal manner [Ref. 4:p. 56]. Using case-mix (DRG) account-
ing measurements, hospital administrators clearly should
be better able to determine which physicians deviate
between their actual costs and the standard costs
associated with the particular DRG. Similarly,
physicians, themselves, will better understand the
ramifications of their medical decisions in an economic
framework. Case-mix methods and measurements allow
hospitals to more precisely identify costs and to gain
insight between these costs (inputs) and services
(outputs) provided. A later section of this chapter will
discuss specific case-mix measurements, the pros and cons
of DRGs, and what incentives exist or do not exist for
physicians to practice medicine more efficiently and
effectively.
D. PRODUCT DEFINITION AND MATRIX ORGANIZATIONS
As previously described, the DRG approach enables
hospitals for the first time to describe their system in
terms of production. Chase and Aquilano define product
as . . . the output from a productive system offered
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for sale (in the case of a business) or otherwise made
available (in the case of a governmental or philanthropic
organization) to some consumer." [Ref. 7:p. 26] A
hospital provides a wide range of services to its
patients. These include x-rays, surgery, nursing care,
physician care, medications, hotel and social services.
Although these services may seemingly be interpreted as
the final output of hospitals, they are only intermediate
outputs. The final output of hospitals is to treat
individual patients; therefore, specific sets of these
intermediate outputs constitutes for each patient a
"product" of the hospital (See Figure 2-4)
.
Fetter and Freeman explain that a hospital is a
".
. . multiproduct firm with each product consisting of
multiple goods and services." [Ref. 5:p. 42] This
product line is extensive and is made up of numerous
intermediate outputs, (hours of nursing care, number of
lab tests, meals, medications, etc.) and inputs (capital,
labor, material) [Ref. 6:p. 231].
Fetter and Freeman view the output of hospitals much
like matrix programs are used in industry, such as in the
development of the U.S. space shuttles or the Apollo
Project. They compare these matrix-type programs to a
hospital's "projects," as "projects" consist of multiple
services (intermediate outputs) based on the types of
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Defining the Product of Hospitals
Figure 2-4
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each particular product (project) being a function of a
patient's condition as well as his/her treatment regimen.
Briefly, as represented in Figure 2-5, what is
proposed by Fetter and Freeman in the clinical matrix
organization is first that physicians be placed in charge
of specific subsets of DRGs. It is their responsibility
to determine the appropriate mix of resources necessary
in diagnosing and treating each type of patient. Second,
middle managers and administrators are responsible for
the operational results of the intermediate support
centers: lab, x-ray, laundry, etc. Thus, physicians are
responsible for defined groups of patients and adminis-
trators are responsible for clinical support services.
[Ref. 5:p. 49]
What the matrix-type organization permits is a means
of measuring performance along whatever product lines are
established. Young and Saltman propose, for example,
that if the average cost for a particular DRG increased
over a set period of time, the reason for the increase
could be explained in one of three ways: increase in use
of resources, increase in resource (input) prices, and/or
decrease in operational efficiency [Ref. 5:p. 49]. A
variance report is designed and used to detect whether
physicians are using more resources than previously used,
or whether administrators are not as productive. Of
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prices—could well be the reason. As with any variance
report, the onus is placed on the person or group
responsible for that profit or activity center to justify
the deviation. For this type of arrangement to be
successful, Fetter and Freeman similarly purport, as do
Young and Saltman, that the control system based on the
matrix organization must have a cost accounting system
which clearly distinguishes between both fixed and
variable costs, and controllable and uncontrollable
costs. [Ref. 5:p. 49] Hence, if the product and matrix
organizational approach is to succeed, case-mix
accounting and budgeting systems, which provide
information along product lines, are required.
In their discussion, Fetter and Freeman clearly
indicate that, even though it is quite possible to have
well-defined case types (with a set of diagnostic and
therapeutic services normally expected) , cost variations
of great significance occur, even for well understood
illnesses where there is great consensus among providers
as to the appropriate treatment process [Ref. 5:p. 43].
Moreover, products are largely identified and broken
down into groups by factors that predict amounts and
types of services required. While the set of services in
Table 1 might well represent the expected values for this
kind of patient (one who is less than 70 years-of-age,
without complications or comorbidities, and with a
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TABLE I
DR6167: APPENDECTOMY W/O COMPLICATED PRINCIPAL DX
A6E< 70 W/O CCa , HOSPITAL X
Resource consumption profile Qty Unit Cost Total Cost
Nursing care days, level 1












Source: Robert B. Fetter, John D. Thompson, and John R. Kimberly, Coses in














primary diagnosis of appendicitis) some conditions vary
considerably in cost of hospitalization. Cost of hospi-
talization is predominantly a function of length of stay
(LOS); ergo, the longer one stays hospitalized, the more
resources are consumed—though perhaps at a diminishing
rate. Length of stay is almost always a physician-deter-
mined variable, though variation by any one physician is
usually quite small. [Ref. 5:p. 44]
Additionally, variation in the cost of care is not
only affected by physicians' decisions but also by the
efficiency of actual hospital production of intermediate
outputs. As previously mentioned, hospitals must be able
to assess, monitor, control and evaluate their
efficiency, but they must also be able to control the
level of effectiveness in which these services are
rendered. Otherwise, they will be unable to control the
process and structure and, while great strides may be
made in improving efficiency, these improvements can be
more than offset by efforts to maximize effectiveness.
For this reason, it is paramount to first develop a
conceptual framework which permits analyzing the system
by defining the actual products. Diagnosis related
groups make this identification of products a reality.
E. AN OVERVIEW OF DIAGNOSIS RELATED GROUPS
Although up to this point we have only mentioned DRGs
in rather broad terms and have cursorily defined what
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they mean, it is appropriate to explain how DRGs evolved
both on the state and federal levels, the statistical
technique used to form DRGs, some other case-mix measures
and, perspectives on the pro and cons of using DRGs as a
patient classification method.
Diagnosis related groups are an outgrowth of what
Fetter and Thompson started to develop at Yale University
in the early 1970s. They realized that to make meaning-
ful comparisons and analyses of hospital management, cost
control, and planning that case-mix information needed to
be included. They further realized that whatever
classification system was developed it needed these four
characteristics [Ref. 8:p. 562]:
. The number of patient groupings should be
manageable;
. The system should use available medical and demo-
graphic data;
. Groupings of medically similar patients should be
statistically stable in terms of the hospital
resources; and
. The statistically similar groups should be similar
medically as well.
They opined that classification based on the above
characteristics would permit DRGs to center on patient
attributes and the treatment process rather than on such
surrogates as bed size, occupancy rate, and service
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capacity of a hospital or its medical staff's specialties
[Ref . l:p. 22]
.
Statistical techniques were used by these researchers
at Yale to form medically coherent groups, groups (i.e.,
DRGs) that used similar quantities and type of resources
and were medically related. Resource consumption was
assumed to vary directly with length of stay and thus LOS
was selected as the dependent variable. In forming the
DRGs, physicians assisted in transforming diagnostic
codes into specific DRG groups. Accordingly, upon
discharge a patient's final diagnosis is used to place
the patient into one of the DRGs.
Diagnosis related groups evolved from the efforts of
Fetter, Freeman, and Thompson as a case-mix grouping
strategy. They based the groupings on diagnostic,
demographic, and therapeutic characteristics of
inpatients using the International Classification of
Disease, 8th revision (ICDA-8) and HICDA-2 diagnostic
codes. The second generation of DRGs, however, uses
ICD-9-CM codes for the basis of its groupings. The first
generation consisted of 383 DRGs and the second has 470.
Both of these groupings are mutually exclusive and
exhaustive. In addition to using different coding
schemes, the biggest difference between these two
generations of DRGs is that the newest DRGs are grouped
based upon specific surgical procedures and secondary
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diagnoses rather than the mere presence or absence of
surgical procedures or secondary diagnoses [Ref. 9:p. 2].
A later section of this chapter discusses more specifi-
cally the role of the ICD-9-CM codes in forming case-mix
definitions and their use in differentiating among levels
of hospital resource use and in differentiating clini-
cally among types of patients.
F. STATISTICAL METHOD USED FOR FORMING DRGs
The statistical method used by Fetter, Freeman, and
Thompson in developing these groupings is a variation of
the Automated Interaction Detector (AID) method of
Sonquist and Morgan [Ref. 10]. Marketing researchers at
the University of Michigan Survey Research Center have
often used AID in analyzing complex sample survey data
which is based on income, age, sex, education, etc. [Ref.
ll:pp. 415-434] [Ref. l:p. 23].
As Grimaldi and Micheletti discuss, the AID's role in
forming DRGs is one of statistical testing; however,
unlike marketing applications more information and input
than just statistics is used in forming these terminal
groups [Ref. l:p. 23]. Specifically, physician input has
been used in formulating groups in order to ensure each
DRG is medically/clinically coherent and meaningful
conditions are contained within each. In using the AID
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package the objective is to identify the "interrelation-
ships of the variables in the database and to determine
which ones are related to some specific measures of
interest, referred to as the dependent variables." [Ref.
4:p. 57] Although the AID package cannot ensure the
groupings are clinically related, physicians can. As
Grimaldi and Micheletti relate [Ref. l:p. 23]:
A medically meaningful classification (scheme)
stimulates expectations as to the natural history of
the disease, the appropriate ways to manage the case,
the prognosis, the likelihood of complications of
specific kinds, of the risk of death. Determination
of medical meaningfulness is therefore a subjective
process, best accomplished by consensus of clinicians
from the defined population. [Ref. 12:p. 249]
Although the primary disadvantage of forming groups
in this manner is a loss of statistical homogeneity, the
DRG system as a whole stands a much greater chance of
being accepted by those who most effect the use of
resources, namely, the physician. With greater physician
acceptance comes a much greater probability of the health
care delivery system achieving the desired outcome.
The actual computer program that formed the DRGs is
known as AUTOGRP (AUTOmatic GRouPing System, pronounced
autogroup) [Ref. l:p. 23]. This program groups informa-
tion by minimizing the distance (unexplained variance)
between observations [Ref. 13:pp. 17-31]. As previously
mentioned, length of stay is the dependent variable. The
objective is to minimize the unexplained sum of squared
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differences. And, of course, the smaller the unexplained
sum of squared differences the more homogeneous the
group; therefore, the smaller the difference the better
is its ability to predict length of stay and supposedly
resource use. [Ref. l:p. 24]
According to Grimaldi and Micheletti, AUTOGRP
attempts to minimize the overall sum of squared differ-
ences (TWGSSQ) by partitioning the population into
subgroups based on diagnoses, procedures, sex, age, or
other variables believed to cluster patients homogeneous-
ly, using a series of binary splits to subdivide patients
based on a myriad of partitioning rules. The TWGSSQ is
calculated as follows:
TWGSSQ= EL (Y ik - Yk )
2
where Y is the average stay of patients in the kth
group. Of course, the desired partition is one that
yields as close to a zero group sum of squares as is
possible. Groups themselves are broken down or split
into subgroups based on whatever partitioning rules are
employed. At some point it is necessary to stop forming
subgroups because the statistical contribution is rela-
tively insignificant or the number of subgroups becomes
unmanageable. [Ref. l:p. 25]
As briefly discussed above there have been two sets
or generations of DRGs developed. The first set was
derived from the medical records of over 700,000
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patients. Diagnostic codes were based on ICDA-8. This
first set consisted of 83 Major Diagnostic Categories
(MDCs) and a total of 383 DRGs. Assignment to a category
and subsequently to a subgroup (or DRG) was based on
primary and secondary diagnoses, surgical procedures,
and/or age [Ref. l:p. 25]. Again, the principal diag-
nosis at discharge determined which MDC was assigned.
Figure 2-6 represents the typical grouping of a MDC under
the ICDA-8 DRGs.
The second generation of DRGs is based on data
provided by the Commission on Professional and Hospital
Activities (CPHA) in which a random sample was taken of
over 400,000 medical records from a population of 1.4
million. The results of this sampling procedure are
shown in Table II. With this newest generation of DRGs
there are 23 major diagnostic categories that contain the
ICD-9-CM DRGs, of which there are 470. Again, unlike the
first generation of DRG assignments, the second genera-
tion is based upon specific surgical procedures and
secondary diagnoses rather than the mere presence or
absence of surgical procedures or secondary diagnoses.
What occurs then with the newest DRG assignment is
that correspondence between the MDC and the ICD-9-CM is
not necessarily one-to-one. For example, CPHA indicates
ICD-9-CM diagnostic codes for the circulatory system are





Diseases of Gall Bladder
and Bile Duct
DRG 228 DRG 229
Source: Paul L. Grimaldi and Julie A. Micheletti, Prospective Pau ment The Definitive
Guide to Reimbursement
. (Chicago: Plunbus Press), 1985, Exhibit 3-1
.




MDCs AND ICD-9-CM CLASSIFICATION SCHEMES
Major Diagnostic Category
1 . Diseases and Disorder
of the Nervous System
2. Diseases and Disorders
of the Eye
3. Diseases and Disorders
of the Ear, Nose, and
Throat
4. Diseases and Disorders
of the Respiratory System
5. Diseases and Disorders
of the Circulatory System
6. Diseases and Disorders
of the Digestive System
7. Diseases and Disorders
of the Hepatobiliary
System and Pancreas
8. Diseases and Disorders
of the Musculoskeletal Sys-
tem and Connective
9. Diseases and Disorders
of the Skin, Subcutaneous







of the Kidney and Urinary
Tract
12. Diseases and Disorders
of the Male Reproductive
System
1 3. Diseases and Disorders
of the Female
Reproductive System
14. Pregnancy , Childbirth
and the Puerperium







Diseases of the Nervous 26,392 35
System and Sense Organs
9,589 13
21,456 26
Diseases of the Respiratory 28,145 28
System
Diseases of the Circulatory 44,342 43
System
Diseases of the Digestive 25,914 18
System
9,086 18
Diseases of the Musculo- 51,235 48
skeletal System and
Connective Tissue
Diseases of the Skin, and 10,336 28
Subcutaneous Tissue
Endocrine, Nutritional, and 7,910 17
Metabolic Diseases and
Immunity Disorders









Certain Conditions Originating 47,209






16. Diseases and Disorders







18. Infectious and Parastic
Diseases (Systemic or
Unspecified Sites)
19. Mental Diseases and
Disorders


















Infectious and Parasitic 2,374 9
Diseases








Classification of Factors 1,788 7
Influencing Health Status
and Contact with Health
Service (Supplementary
Classification)
Source: The New ICD-9-CM Diagnosis Related Groups Classification Scheme : User Manual (New Haven,
CT : Yale University Scholl of Organization and Management, December 1 981 ). Table 32. Updated as per
Health Systems International Manual.
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eleven MDCs—1,4 to 9, 11 to 13, and 18. Also, the
number of DRGs within each MDC ranges from 5 in MDC 22 to
48 in MDC 8. Again, the new DRGs use the body system
(e.g., reproductive or nervous) as the primary factor for
determining assignment within the MDC and to a specific
DRG. Greater emphasis is now placed on grouping sub-
groups in some kind of clinical relationship to one
another. Even greater physician and other professional
input was used to develop the ICD-9-CM DRGs. [Ref. l:p.
28]
Unlike the first generation, which used LOS data for
final groupings, the second generation of DRGs reflect
modifications suggested by cost data obtained from
330,000 records for patients discharged in 1979 from a
total of 33 New Jersey hospitals [Ref. l:p. 28]. There
are a number of other distinct differences between these
two generations of DRGs. Unique characteristics of the
second generation include [Ref. l:pp. 28-33]:
. initial partition for each MDC except 14,15, 17,
20, and 22 depends on the presence of an operating
room (OR) procedure rather than the principal
diagnosis;
. patients with an eligible OR procedure are parti-
tioned into a group believed to be the most
resource intensive depending on the surgical code
reported;
. the ranking of qualifying secondary diagnoses and
procedures in terms of resource consumption does
not affect DRG assignment (i.e., approximately 210




. the principal diagnosis of any patient who is
initially assigned to MDC 5 and subsequently has an
acute myocardial infarction is classified AMI
regardless of the diagnosis;
. different and greater number of variables are used
to form the ICD-9-CM DRGs;
. age is a criterion for grouping patients in
approximately 55 percent of the ICD-9-CM DRGs, with
18 and 70 years being the critical ages;
. patients who die are placed into one two DRGs (123
or 385)
.
If one contrasts the two generations of DRGs,
identifying the key grouping variables, as represented in
Table III, it should be rather easy to discern the key
differences.
Even though other partitioning variables (e.g., type
of payer, admission diagnosis, type of admission, number
of complications and comorbities, etc.) were analyzed
using AUTOGRP none of these were employed in forming the
ICD-9-CM DRGs since their contributions were not statis-
tically or medically meaningful [Ref. l:pp. 28-33].
The figure that follows is representative of the 23
MDCs and should aid in understanding how assignments are
made to specific DRGs (See Figure 2-7) . The entire 23
decision trees and Medicare titles for each DRG are
contained in Appendix B. Figure 2-7, a decision tree,
illustrates the DRG assignment for patients with a
principal diagnosis that places them in MDC 7. The first
partition in the surgical half of the MDC is predicated
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TABLE III
KEY GROUPING VARIABLES FOR ICDA-8 AND ICD-9-CM DRGs
ICDA-8 DRGs ICD-9-CM DRGsb
Principal diagnosis Principal diagnosis
Secondary diagnosis Operating-room procedure
Principal procedure Age of patient at admission





a Used to form one DRG
b Most frequently used variables
Source: Paul L. Grimaldi and Julie A. Micheletti, Prospective Payment: The
Definitive Guide to Reimbursement (Chicago,Ill: Pluribus Press, 1965)-
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on the type of surgical procedure: pancreas, liver,
shunt, or biliary tract, or exploratory diagnostic
workup, or other OR procedure. When patients have more
than one type of OR procedure they are usually assigned
to the most resource-intensive DRG; intensity of
resources normally decreases as one moves rightward along
the surgical branch of the MDC [Ref. l:p. 33].
Additional splits are required for surgical patients
before they can be assigned to a DRG. If the pancreas,
liver or shunt OR procedure is considered major then the
patient is assigned to DRG 191; if not, he is assigned to
DRG 192. If the biliary tract procedure does not require
a total cholecystectomy then the subdivision is made
based on whether the patient is over age 69 or a
complication or comorbidity (labeled 70 CC) is present.
If one or more of these three conditions exist then the
patient is placed in DRG 193; otherwise, the patient is
placed in DRG 194. On the other hand, if a "total
cholecystectomy" is performed then a split is made at the
"common bile duct exploration" looping variable and again
at the "Age 70 CC" looping variables before assignment is
made to one of four terminal DRGs: 195 through 198.
Patients that have an exploratory diagnostic workup
procedure are subdivided based upon the "malignancy" of
their principal diagnosis. Patients with malignant
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principal diagnosis go to DRG 200. The terminal DRG 201
is used for all other diseases and disorders of the
hepatobiliary system.
The medical partitioning of MDC seven assignments are
somewhat easier to determine. The principal diagnosis
—
malignancy, pancreas, cirrhosis and alcoholic hepatitis,
liver, or biliary tract—determines which DRG these
medical conditions are assigned. Only in the later two
principal diagnoses are they further subdivided and then
by the looping variable of "Age 70 CC." Assignment in
the MDC 7 medical partitioning runs rightward from DRG
202 to DRG 208. Accordingly, MDC 7 has eleven surgical
DRGs and seven medical DRGs.
G. STATE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEMS:
THE NEW JERSEY EXPERIENCE
Although a prospective payment system on the federal
level (Medicare) is relatively new, several states have
been using some form of PPS for a number of years. The
first state rate-regulating law was enacted in New York
in 1969 and followed in the 1970s by : Connecticut,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Washington,
Wisconsin, and New Jersey [Ref. 3:p. 7]. Of these
states, New Jersey has commanded the greatest amount of
attention because of its success with not only a
prospective payment system but also with one that
incorporates the use of DRGs.
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Because New Jersey's "experience" is similar in many
respects (i.e., its ostensible objective of cost
containment and use of DRGs in its PPS) to Medicare's,
many health care analyst and governmental officials have
thoroughly evaluated New Jersey's PPS, drawing valuable
lessons learned so that these lessons could be appro-
priately applied to other state programs and Medicare
[Ref. 14:p. 43]. Additionally, other third party payers
are evidencing a keen interest in DRGs, PPS, and case-mix
accounting, as a promising means of controlling and
containing costs.
Because of the similarities between the Medicare and
the New Jersey DRG/PPS systems and because of the
involvement (funding) of the federal Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA) in the experimental New
Jersey's DRG/PPS, it behooves one to briefly review the
New Jersey "experience" before analyzing the federal
DRG/PPS program. This review will assess the motivation
for the program, its salient characteristics, the
implementation results, organizational pressures and
incentives, the financial and economic impact and finally
discuss the major differences between New Jersey's
program and the Medicare program.
The premise on which the New Jersey's Department of
Health uses the DRG method of hospital reimbursement is
on the belief that economic incentives can be used to
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improve hospital efficiency and to contain health care
expenditures. The primary impetus behind the coalition
that passed the 1978 New Jersey legislation was not
strictly cost containment as one might think but rather
two other pressing issues: (1) the escalating and
seemingly uncontrollable growth in bad debts, which were
threatening the inner city hospitals' financial via-
bility, and (2) the increasing differential between Blue
Cross regulated payments to hospitals and the uncontrol-
led charges that private insurers faced [Ref. 14:p. 43].
The reimbursement reform intent was to provide greater
financial stability to the New Jersey hospitals and to
all commercial and private third party payers. Inciden-
tally, one of the unique characteristics of the New
Jersey experience is that PPS and the use of DRG case-mix
reimbursement applies to all third party payers
—
govern-
mental, commercial, and private [Ref. 15: p. 548].
As Sapolsky, Greene, and Weiner discuss, New Jersey
state officials selected DRG-type prospective reimburse-
ment methods based upon case-mix [Ref. 14:pp. 43-46].
Beginning in 1980, New Jersey implemented PPS using DRGs
in 26 of the state's 93 general acute care institutions.
Although it was New Jersey's intent when it passed the
reimbursement reform initiative to pay only one prospec-
tive rate for each DRG, analyzes indicated that the cost
variation among New Jersey's hospitals was quite great.
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Even in retrospect it is impossible to ascertain what
specifically accounted for these variations: real cost
differences and/or unlike patients classified together.
However, those hospitals who felt they were at a disad-
vantage were most acrimonious. As a result of their
perceived disadvantage and incessant criticism of the DRG
system, hospitals were granted relief in two forms.
First, three classes were established for teaching
hospitals because of the demonstrative correlation of
cost and size. Second, the DRG rate itself was
recomputed to reflect a blend of "each hosptial's own
historical costs and its class average." [Ref. 14:p. 44]
Thus, there are three factors upon which New Jersey's DRG
rates are based [Ref. 15:p. 549]:
Cost of Hospital-Based Physician
Services
DRG Payment Rate for PLUS
Direct Patient Care = Portion of Hospital's Own
Non-Physician Cost
PLUS
Portion of Standard Non-Physi-
cian Cost
Effectively what the above modification does to the
reimbursement system is to weaken the incentives for
efficiency. The system designers had thought by allowing
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hospital-specific costs in the reimbursement formula that
in the "outyears" the revised DRG rates would reflect new
efficiencies and that periodic "rebasing" would
supposedly "ratchet down" costs statewide [Ref. 14:p.44].
As Sapolsky and Wasserman discuss, when periodic
"rebasing" took effect in 1984 the "ratching down" of
costs really meant an adjustment upward to reflect the
increased cost (i.e., the base year of 1979 was replaced
with cost data from 1982). Whatever new efficiencies
were perhaps achieved by using DRGs, they were more than
offset by an increase in new services and costs of
technological improvements; the overall result of using
the 1982 cost data "rebasing" is an increase of nearly
six percent above regular inflation [Ref. 14:p. 44].
Moreover, the organizational affect of DRG prospective
reimbursement on New Jersey hospitals has been
significant. [Ref. 15:pp. 553- 554]:
. The quantity and type of information collected in
DRG hospitals has expanded, with the development of
sophisticated management information systems;
. Decision making in the DRG hospitals is now much
more decentralized than in non-DRG hospitals;
. The importance of the medical records department in
comparison with other hospital departments has
increased dramatically;
. The medical staffs' role in managerial decision
making has increased;
. The focus of hospital administrators has
discernibly shifted from an input orientation to
one of producing or managing outputs.
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While it may be too early to draw comprehensive and
irrefutable conclusions about the New Jersey experience
in economic and financial terms there are several points
worth discussing. One of the foremost of these points
revolves around the question," How much more does it cost
to operate a DRG system"? Certainly extra costs through
additional employees and computer capacity have been
incurred in implementing this system. May and Wasserman
conducted a study, concluding that an extra $7.23 was
added to each patient's bill so that this additional cost
could be recouped. Also, the State of New Jersey in
developing and administering the system incurred a total
cost of $9.35 million of which $4.7 million was funded by
the federal government. [Ref. 15:pp. 553-554]
Perhaps the most important question that needs to be
answered is, "Does the DRG prospective reimbursement
system result in a more efficient system"? or asked in a
different manner, "Is the DRG system more cost beneficial
than other reimbursement systems"? One study concludes
(though tentatively) that each of the 26 institutions
that started DRG reimbursement in the first year (1980)
received on the average $2.3 million more than they
otherwise would have received under the preexisting
system [Ref. 15:p. 555]. Another study indicates the
rate of increase in per capita hospital expenditures
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during the first four years under the DRG system approxi-
mates the same trend line as that under the previous
reimbursement system [Ref. 14:p. 44], Again, it is still
too early to draw definitive conclusions about the
efficacy of DRGs, but what can be concluded is that New
Jersey has succeeded in attaining one its explicit goals,
if not exceeding it, namely, improving the financial
solvency of its inner city hospitals (and also all other
hospitals in the state) . However, achieving this program
goal may be at the expense of an improved reimbursement
system, which is effective in containing cost [Ref.
15:p. 557]
.
Although there are many similarities and numerous
comparatively minor differences between the New Jersey's
and HCFA's Medicare reimbursement programs, there are
several distinct differences, differences that make a
one-to-one comparison difficult on some levels and
impossible on other levels. First, as previously identi-
fied, New Jersey purposely and successfully spread the
costs of inpatient bad debt and uncompensated care over
all third-party payers. Second, New Jersey did this by
requiring all third party payers to pay the hospitals'
DRG rates, which effectively precludes cost shifts among
payers [Ref. 15:p. 551]. Medicare does not! The
significance lies in the fact that those hospitals which
treat a greater percentage of the poor lose in the
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reimbursement game. That is, Medicare does not reimburse
for bad debts. Additionally, since DRGs and the PPS
apply only to Medicare, hospitals can merely shift
shortfalls for DRG patients to other payers. Having this
"flexibility," of course, weakens the incentive for cost
containment and efficient management.
Indubitably, the insurance companies will not sit
idly by as these costs are shifted to them. They will
most likely establish "preferred provider" arrangements
using prospective DRG payment rates with individual
institutions or lobby state legislators to adopt a
state-administered all-payer program similar perhaps to
the one in New Jersey [Ref. 15:p. 551], As hospital
rates continue to escalate and as additional costs are
shifted to other payers (e.g., insurance companies and
U. S. businesses) lobbying efforts will likewise in-
crease. It would seem then inevitable that the federal
political bargaining process could precipitate modifi-
cations to the Medicare program such that it too becomes
potentially less effective as a cost containment
mechanism.
H. OTHER CASE-MIX MEASURES
In addition to DRGs, there are other methods that
employ case-mix measures. Briefly, we shall describe
each of the more widely known case-mix measures, con-
trasting the differences and comparing the similarities.
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The reason these "other case-mix measures" are
discussed in this separate section is twofold. First,
HCFA is concerned that it may be overpaying hospitals
with a less complex patient mix, and second, lobbying
efforts by those concerned with the continued financial
viability of larger teaching facilities that treat more
complex illnesses are mounting a persuasive drive for
revisions in their payment rates so that they can recover
the full cost of providing services to such patients
[Ref. 3:p. 15]. The case-mix measures to be discussed
are: Disease Staging, Patient Severity Index, Patient
Care Units, and CHPA List A.
The first to be discussed is disease staging. One of
the often heard criticisms of ICD-9-CM DRG method is that
it fails to account for severity of illness, (i.e., the
more severe a patient's condition the more resources he
consumes in treatment) . With the present DRG system
patients can be classified into the same DRG but still
consume considerably different amounts of resources.
Disease staging, however, groups or clusters by severity
of illness rather than by length of stay or cost.
Disease staging does use the ICD-9-CM medical conditions
as do DRGs; it does not use AUTOGRP for formation but
rather a priori professional judgments of a 23-member
physician panel [Ref. l:p. 46]. This classification
system, as well indicated by its name, normally bases
64
group formation on four stages of a specific organ/body
system, stages which range from conditions of no compli-
cations or minimal severity to death. Table IV lists the
15 body-systems that are used in forming disease-staged
groups.
Several studies compare the homogeneity of groupings
in disease staging with those in DRGs. Grimaldi and
Micheletti conclude that both of these classification
systems explain a large amount of the sum of squared
differences but that the DRG classification scheme
performs better since it is constructed along statistical
guidelines which minimize the unexplained sum of squared
differences. [Ref. l:p. 48]
The second type of case-mix measure is the patient
severity index (PSI) . Developed by researchers at John
Hopkins University, the PSI also incorporates severity of
illness into its grouping process, requiring evaluators
and raters to review the patient's medical record upon
discharge based upon seven variables [Ref. 3:p. 15]:
. stage of principal diagnosis,
. concurrent interacting conditions,
. rate of response to therapy or recovery rate,
. impairment remaining after therapy,
. complications of the principal diagnosis,
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TABLE IV
BODY SYSTEM CATE60RIES FOR DISEASE STAGING
Body System Categories
1. Diseases of the Skin
2. Diseases of the Nervous System and Cerebral Vessels
3. Diseases of the Eye
4. Diseases of the Ear, Nose, Throat, and Sinuses
5. Respiratory Disease
6. Gastrointestinal Diseases
7. Hepatobiliary and Pancreatic Diseases
8. Diseases of the Circulatory System
9. Diseases of the Urinary Tract
10. Diseases of Mole Genitalia
1 1. Diseases of the Female Reproductive System
12. Diseases of the Endocrine System
13. Hemopoietic and Reticuloendothelial Diseases
14. Musculosketal Diseases and Traumas



















Source: Paul L. Grimakti and Jubt A. Michetetti, Prospgctiw Payment : Th» Pefimtiv* Guide to
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.
patient dependence on hospital staff and other
resources, and
.
nonoperating room life support procedures.
Figure 2-8 represents the PSI matrix-type approach
used by evaluators when classifying an inpatient's stay.
A prerequisite for this system is to use trained evalua-
tors, who assign composite severity scores based upon the
seven variables identified above and the relative
severity. Surprisingly, homogeneity of resource consump-
tion in terms of charges, length of stay, and total costs
indicates the PSI method of clustering patients is
superior to any other method. [Ref. l:p. 56]
The third case-mix classification system to be
discussed is the patient care units (PCUs) , which are
based on time-and-motion studies that estimate the cost
of over 600 clinical services [Ref. l:p. 58]. These are
somewhat similar to the "resource consumption profile"
codes mentioned in the section on product definition and
matrix organization. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania
is developing a similar patient management category
system but uses 50 disease-specific physician panels to
cluster and separate diseases/medical problems [Ref. 3:p.
16]. Additionally, admitting diagnosis is factored into
this classification scheme on the assumption that physi-
cians "treat symptoms and suspected conditions," a fact
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not often borne out by the principal diagnosis [Ref. l:p.
58] .
The fourth and last of the case-mix measurements to
be discussed is the CHPA List A. Although there are only
398 diagnostic groups, there are nearly 8,000 subgroups,
which are divided into five age classes and cross tabu-
lated by the presence or absence of surgery and the
number (single or multiple) of diagnoses [Ref. l:p. 58].
Needless to say, this method does not appeal to those
interested in case-mix measurements because it fails to
be easily manageable and to measure explicit resource
consumption.
Figure 2-9 provides a good synopsis of the classi-
fication schemes discussed in this section as well as
those discussed in previous sections. Even though one
inpatient classification scheme may be superior in many
respects to another it does not necessarily indicate it
should be chosen in all applications. There is no
universal panacea to case-mix measurement. Undoubtedly,
case-mix measurements are in an early stage of develop-
ment and must undergo numerous refinements before one is
heralded as the solution to the cost containment problem,
if ever.
I. CONTROVERSY OVER DRGs: LITERATURE REVIEW
As will be discussed in the next chapter on
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Figure 2-9
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Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 and the Social Security
Amendments of 1983 took effect on 1 October 1983,
requiring a PPS based on illness-specific conditions for
all Medicare patients. The PPS uses diagnosis related
groups (DRGs) as a classification method for these
illness-specific conditions. The efficacy of DRGs as a
mechanism for controlling costs and improving resource
use is one of controversy. In this section we will
examine and analyze recent literature and the various
perspectives on this controversy and comment on what
might lie ahead for DRGs.
Looking first at the positive comments on DRGs, the
discussion focuses primarily on the hospitals' ability to
maintain financial viability. Spiegel and Kavalier note
that Rajani views the DRG system as one that provides a
"pro-market discipline," as well as a "pro-competitive
nature." [Ref. 16:p. 83] Fetter and Freeman see a
decidedly positive aspect of DRGs in that they enable
hospitals, whether they are not-for-profit or for-profit,
to organize themselves--st ructure and process— in the
manner of selling a product. Similarly, and perhaps one
of the greatest advantages of the DRG system, is it
provides a direct link between financial data and
clinical information, allowing much better control over
services (products) and costs to provide those services
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[Ref. 5:pp. 41-54]. The goals of efficiency and
effectiveness are better balanced, with greater emphasis
given now to marginal analysis and measurement of the
production relationship of inputs to outputs [Ref. 17:pp.
22-27], The design incentive of the DRG system is for
hospitals to operate more efficiently within the
prospective reimbursement rates rather than merely
passing costs through and onto Medicare as in the old
program, which used retrospective reimbursement.
Proponents of the DRG system contend that its very
design also requires the board, physician, administrator,
and staff to become more closely aligned in selecting and
pursuing common goals [Ref. 18:pp. 677-679]. This goal
consensus supposes more efficient use of resources and a
streamlined pursuit of agreed-upon objectives. Rather
than working at cross purposes there is a greater
incentive to work together. DRGs "appear" to provide
incentives to organizational participants (including
physicians) to move from what was previously an almost
exclusively effectiveness model to one driven, in greater
part by efficiency. The DRG system allows hospitals and
its many participants to focus concomitantly on issues
dealing with efficiency and effectiveness by using a
"common product language" and making tradeoffs between
these two models [Ref. 19:pp. 1-37].
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There is only a paucity of physicians and
administrators who maintain the DRG system will
ameliorate the quality of care. Kaemmerer, for instance,
believes DRGs enable physicians to better understand
their practice patterns through comparison with other
hospital physicians [Ref. 18:pp. 677-679]. Riddick
thinks DRGs stimulate physicians to evaluate their
"therapeutic customs and rituals," weighing better
measures of effectiveness against resource use [Ref.
20:pp. 17-18]. Potentially, then, a hospital can
sensitize its physicians to evaluate appropriateness of
care not only in terms of absolute quality but also in
the framework of cost effectiveness.
Though a considerable literature supports the DRG
system, there are critics who vehemently hold that the
DRG system is insidious and, in some instances, outright
nefarious. One of the most outspoken of these critics is
J. A. Meyer, of the American Enterprise Institute, who
believes the DRG system is filled with "... excep-
tions, appeals, all kinds of loopholes, 467 categories
that will probably turn into 967 categories . . . (and) .
. . unfairness ..." [Ref. 16:p. 82]. Because of the
severity differences within the DRG cells, he feels the
system as designed encourages hospitals to "skim the
cream": the design incentives motivate hospitals to
accept the most profitable cases and shun those that are
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not. Meyer also criticizes the DRGs for being an
incomplete cost control device and for failing to address
admissions, preventive care, and physicians in its
efforts to contain costs. That is, as designed the DRG
system fails to address the totality and, while
potentially optimizing subsystems, it is done at the
expense of the system as a whole. Meyer's position seems
analogous to that of Kerr who believes that the system is
not designed to reward behavior it supposedly seeks [Ref.
21:pp. 769-783]. To be so, it would include all relevant
health care delivery subsystems, particularly incentives
for physicians.
As a cost-control method for curbing rising Medicare
costs, the DRG system is seen by its critics to be a
control mechanism that curbs primarily the quality of
care and physician treatment patterns and incidentally,
then only potentially, the cost of care. Again, DRGs
seem to "deincentivize" the provision of optimal patient
care by providing incentives for hospitals to seek the
most profitable DRGs and to cut those that are
unprofitable.
Critics maintain that Medicare (DRG) regulations
contain numerous loopholes and gaps which permit manipu-
lation and gaming of patients' diagnoses by hospitals
trying to maximize their DRG reimbursement [Ref. 22:pp.
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295-300]. Newhauser vividly underscores this point in a
message he makes to physicians:
How to play games with the DRG payment system may
become a popular parlor pastime, and even though the
"feds" have spent quite a bit of time playing this
game too and thinking about preventive strategies,
they will be only partly successful. Predictably,
their lack of success will set the stage for still
another approach to payment. [Ref. 16 :p. 86]
Other criticism is levied at the DRG system for
discouraging large capital investments, as fixed DRG
rates do not permit this cost to be directly passed on
and borne by the Medicare program [Ref. 16:pp. 86-87].
Regarding goal consensus and interactions among the
board, administrators, and physicians, critics believe
the DRG system will create an even greater adversarial
relationship [Ref. 20:pp. 17-18]. Hospital adminis-
trators are largely motivated by the efficiency model
while the physician is motivated by the effectiveness
model. In fact, Bird thinks the physician's individual
incentives are unaffected by the DRG system [Ref. 16 :p.
87]. Since the DRG system as designed fails to reward
desired physician behavior, hospital administrators may
well find themselves countinuing in the role of cajoling
medical staff support in an effort to elicit desired
behavior
.
Considerable opposition is found in the literature to
the method in which DRGs are formed. Critics contend
that homogeneity of patients is impossible and that there
75
is no such thing as the "average" patient [Ref. 16:p. 88]
[Ref. 23:pp. 1195-1199]. Moreover, many express concern
that DRGs fail to reflect variations in resources
consumed and in disease/illness levels [Ref. 23:pp. 1195-
1199] [Ref. 8:pp. 388-396], Others contend length of
stay is not an accurate reflection of resources consumed,
or of the costs incurred. Hughes, in a letter to the
Annals of Internal Medicine , attacks the DRG system on
the grounds that, "There is a distinct failure to
identifying multiple complications or comorbid conditions
in individual patients." [Ref. 16:p. 89] In other
words, hospitals are reimbursed for only one condition
per patient, regardless how many might be treated.
The critics really lambaste the DRG system for the
perceived affect it may have on lowering medical stan-
dards and in limiting the pursuit of technological
advances [Ref. 25:p. 76]. Reimbursement calculations
fail to adequately cover technological progression and
provisions for innovations. In fact, a Presidential
report indicates scientific advances are "likely" to be
stifled [Ref. 26:p. 25-26] [Ref. 16:pp. 87-91].
Depending on where one stands, one can make a
defensible and cogent argument for or against the DRG
system. For example, on the issue of a more sophisti-
cated and complete data base as a natural extension of
DRG management, the critics say the costs are prohibitive
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and the data itself of questionable value; whereas, the
DRG advocates indicate the data base ensures accurate
record keeping and insight into hospital activities far
beyond today's capabilities [Ref. 20:pp. 17-18].
The debate over the efficacy of DRGs will continue
for some years. As conclusive evidence becomes avail-
able, and as shortcomings are detected, refined proce-
dures are and should be devised to make the DRG system
both more efficient and effective, such as incentivizing
physicians to demonstrate desired behavior, incorporating
a severity of illness measurement criterion, and modify-
ing Medicare regulations to permit reasonable techno-
logical advances and modest capital expansion. Moreover,
all facets of the health care delivery system must be
incorporated into the analysis in order to obviate
suboptimization of the system for what might be optimal
subsystems.
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III. REIMBURSEMENT AND EXPENSE METHODS
A. INTRODUCTION
The discussion of Public Law 98-21 and the Medical
Expense and Performance Reporting System for Fixed
Military Medical and Dental Treatment Facilities (MEPR)
presented below is not all inclusive. Rather, it
attempts to provide a fundamental framework with which
the reader unfamiliar with PPS and MEPR will be better
prepared to understand the analysis and findings
contained in this thesis.
B. MEDICARE'S PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM (PPS) UNDER
PUBLIC LAW 98-21.
On April 20, 1983, President Reagan signed the Social
Security Amendments of 1983 (P.L. 98-21). Title VI of
this law, which applies to all short-term acute care
hospitals, modifies the traditional retrospective method
Medicare uses to reimburse hospitals. P.L. 98-21
replaces retrospective cost-based reimbursement with a
prospective payment system. The PPS builds on methods
and procedures used to establish case-mix indexes, cost
weights, and target ceilings under the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982 (P.L. 97-248)
[Ref. l:p. 99]. Unlike the cos t-pe r-case limit
established by TEFRA, the provisions of P.L. 98-21:
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1. sever the traditional relationship between
actual costs and the revenues generated by
providing inpatient care to Medicare
beneficiaries;
2. constitute the basis for establishing
prospective prices for each of 470 DRGs;
3. assign financial risk for unfavorable variances
between the cost of providing care and the
predetermined DRG price to the hospital; and
4. permit the hospital to retain favorable
variances between the cost of providing the
care and the corresponding predetermined DRG
price. [Ref. 3:p. 8]
Starting with cost-reporting periods after September
30, 1983, hospitals are paid prospectively-established
rates for Medicare patients discharged from participating
hospitals. Eventually, with certain exceptions, this new
payment system mandates paying the same DRG rate to all
participating hospitals.
1. DRG Payment Determination
The basis of hospital reimbursement under the PPS
is the discharge diagnosis of the particular patient.
The payment for each DRG is established on the basis of
three sources of data: the Medicare cost report, the
Medicare discharge file, and the MEDPAR file. The
Medicare cost report contains the cost information that
hospitals submit to fiscal intermediaries in order to be
reimbursed for care provided to Medicare patients. The
Medicare discharge file indicates the number of Medicare
patients admitted to a hospital in a given year. From
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these two sources, the HCFA determines a national average
cost per discharge. The MEDPAR file is a 20 percent
sample of Medicare patient bills from short-stay
hospitals. It is used to create the DRG cost weights,
listed in Appendixes C, D, and E, and case-mix measures.
These measures indicate the relative costliness of
providing care for different Medicare patients in
relation to the average cost per patient [Ref. l:p. 115].
For example, if the cost per patient MEDPAR file
indicates that the care of a patient in DRG 125 is 1.2
more costly than the care of the average Medicare
patient, the DRG cost weight is 1.2. If the national
average cost per Medicare discharge is $1,000, the
hospital would be reimbursed for the care of a patient in
providing service in DRG 125 at a rate of $1,000 x 1.2,
or $1,200. The steps used by the HCFA to calculate DRG
cost weights and case-mix measures are illustrated in
Figure 3-1.
2. Transition Period
Congress provided a three-year phase-in period so
hospitals would have an opportunity to adjust to the
prospective system. During this transition period
composite DRG payment rates are established for each
hospital participating in the Medicare program. This
rate is unique for each hospital during the transition
period, but after FY 86 a standard national payment rate
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DRG payment rates, as illustrated by Figure 3-2, are made
up of a federal portion and a hospital-specific portion.
The federal portion is made up of regional and national
average rates, which take into account whether the
hospital is located in an urban or rural area. The
hospital-specific portion is derived from unique hospital
cost characteristics computed on a base year. In most
cases, this base year is 1981. As the health care
industry proceeds through the transition period,
increased emphasis is placed on the federal payment
amounts, with decreasing emphasis on a hospital's oase-
year costs.

















For example, in the first year of the transition period
(the fiscal year beginning October 1, 1983 (FY 84), and
ending October 1, 1984) 75 percent of the payment rate
for an individual hospital was based on a hospital's
TEFRA target amount (hospital-specific portion) , which is
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adjusted for inflation by the hospital market basket
increase plus a one percent technology factor. The
remaining 25 percent is based on a regional DRG rate
(federal portion)
. In the second year of the transition
this ratio changes to a 50/50 split between the hospital-
specific portion and the federal portion. The federal
portion is divided between a regional rate and a national
rate on a 37.5/12.5 respective basis. In year three, the
ratio changes to 25/75 with the federal portion being
equally divided between the regional and national rates.
In the final year of transition (beginning October l f
1986), 100 percent of the payment rate is based on a
national rate [Ref. 2:p. 20].
3 . Calculation of Prospective Payment Revenue
To determine "who gets what for services
rendered" one must consider the following factors:
a. Adjusted Federal Standard Rate,
b. TEFRA Target Amount (hospital-specific)
,
c. DRG relative cost weights,
d. Regional Wage Indexes, and
e. The ICD-9-CM DRG to which the patient has
been assigned.
In general, as illustrated in Figure 3-2 and
Table V, the federal standardized and hospital-specific
amounts are combined to calculate an overall average
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CALCULATION OF PAYMENT RATE FOR DR6 125, URBAN HOSPITAL X,
WEST SOUTH CENTRAL REGION: FISCAL YEARS (FYs) 1984-1986
(Rounded in Dollars)
Component FY 1984 FY 1985 FY 1986
Hospital portion:
Adjusted ban year cost $3,096 $3,096 $3,0%




Target percent _• xl.06 x 1.124
$2,983 $3,067 $3,252
DROwight xl.6455 x 1.6455 x 1.6455
$4,760 $3,047 $5,351
Hospital percent x.75 x .50 x 25
Hospital amount $3 570 $2,524 $1,338
Regional Portion:
Standard amount for labor-
related Herns $2,146 $2,146 $2,146
Vage Index X 1.1119 x 1.1119 x 1.1119
$2,3286 $2,386 $2,386
Staitdard amounts for non-






x 375 x 375
$1 ,936 $2,052
$2,206 $2,206















Regiooal percent x 25
Regwoal amount $1,217
National portion:
Standard amounts for labor-
related items $2,206
Vage vtdox X 1.1119
$2,453







National percent x .00
National amount $0
Total payment rate $4.787
Note * Base year costs are updated through FY 1984. Target percent equals inflation plus one percentage
point per year
Source: Hospital Progress , October 1983.
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adjusted by the hospital's regional wage index. Next,
the overall average is multiplied by the appropriate DRG
cost weight to obtain the payment for a given DRG.
Once the appropriate DRG discharge rates have
been determined, one can calculate the hospital's total
Medicare inpatient revenue. As demonstrated by Figure
3-3, the total Medicare inpatient revenue is made up of a
DRG inlier portion, an outlier portion, and a allowable
cost portion. To calculate the total Medicare revenue
for a hospital one simply sums the three cost inputs.
Total Inlier Outlier Allowable
Medicare = Portion + Portion + Cost
Revenue Portion
The inlier portion is that part of Medicare
revenue which is included in the composite DRG payment
rates discussed earlier. The total inlier portion is
obtained by determining the appropriate rate per
discharge in the hospital and then summing the results
[Ref. l:p. 108].
Total Inlier = (Federal + Hospital-Specific) x DRG Wgt
Revenue Portion) Portion)
The outlier portion, which is reimbursed on a
retrospective basis, is that part of Medicare revenue
















































Source : Paul L. Grimaldi and Julie A. Micheletti, Prospective Payment The
Definitive Guide to Reimburspment
,
(Chicago, 111. : Pluribus Press), 1985,
Exhibit 3-11
Medicare Inpatient Revenue, FY 1905
Figure 3-3
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long (day outliers) or costly (cost outliers) stays for a
particular DRG discharge. Day outliers are patients
whose length of stay exceeds the average (mean) stay for
a DRG discharge by 22 days or 1.94 standard deviations,
whichever results in a smaller number of days [Ref. l:p.
108] . Cost outliers are patients whose charges adjusted
to costs exceed the DRG payment rate by the larger of
$13,000 or double the relevant DRG payment rate [Ref.
l:p. 109]. To obtain the total outlier revenue, one
simply adds together authorized day and cost outlier
costs.
Total Outlier = (Day Outlier + Cost Outliers)
Revenue
The last source of Medicare revenue results from
allowable costs excluded from a hospital's prospective
payment rates [Ref. 27:p. 20007]. These costs are
reimbursed on a retrospective reimbursable basis and
include the following:
* Capital-related Costs
* Direct and Indirect Medical Education Costs
* Nonphysician Anesthetist Costs
* Bad Debts
* FICA Costs
* Part B Costs
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A more complete discussion of these special costs, as
well as the cost foundation on which the federal and
hospital-specific rates are based, is presented in
Appendix A.
C. THE DOD'S MEDICAL COST ACCOUNTING REPORTING SYSTEM
1 . Background
The evolution of the MEPR as a viable reporting
system has evolved from "any reporting system is better
than none" to a reporting system linked directly to
expenses incurred by military treatment facilities
(MTFs). Prior to the development of the MEPR the
services primarily used two surrogate measures of output
to report performance: (1) occupied bed days and (2)
composite work units. Even though these two output
measures might appear to be viable performance reporting
mechanisms, they did little to aide managers in
determining "how well the job got done." In 1975, as a
result of dramatic health care cost escalations, coupled
with an inadequate management information system in DOD
MTFs, a new reporting system called the Uniform Chart of
Accounts for Military Medical Treatment Facilities (UCA)
was developed by a tri-service health care study group.
The primary objective of UCA was to establish a
management information system that standardized cost and
performance reporting through the use of fundamental (#
9Q
of procedures), derived (cost per visit); and fiat
(depreciation) measures. Since its implementation in the
fall of 1978, UCA has remained intact with only minor
revisions. Today, however, its name has been changed to
the Medical Expense and Performance Reporting System for
Fixed Military Medical and Dental Treatment Facilities.
2. The Medical Expense and Performance Reporting
Svstem for Fixed Military Medical and Dental
Treatment Facilities
The information contain in this section was
primarily extracted from the MEPR Manual, DOD 6010. 13M;
therefore, the discussion of the MEPR is best done in the
context of a review of DOD 6010. 13M [Ref. 28:p. 5-17].
The MEPR manual is composed of five chapters with each
chapter, other than chapter one, representing integral
elements of the uniform reporting system. The chapters
are titled as follows:
Chapter 1 - General
Chapter 2 - Chart of Accounts
Chapter 3 - Manpower and Expense Assignment
Chapter 4 - Issues System
Chapter 5 - Reporting Requirements
a. Chart of Accounts
"Chart of Accounts" is the heart of the MEPR
manual. Within this section of the manual a hierarchy of
accounts have been constructed wherein all expenses and
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Inpatient Care is defined as health care
which provides for the examination, diagnosis, treatment
and proper disposition of inpatients. This functional
category is a summarizing account that accumulates all
inpatient operating expenses. It represents the total
cost of inpatient care delivered in the MTF.
Ambulatory Care provides for the care,
consultation, examination, diagnosis, treatment and
disposition of both inpatients and outpatients treated by
the various ambulatory care clinics. Like the inpatient
care category, it is a summarizing account. It
represents the total cost of ambulatory care.
The Dental Care functional account includes
all the operating expenses incurred in operating and
maintaining a dental center, a dental clinic, or a
prosthetic laboratory.
Ancillary Services are defined as those
services that participate in the care of patients by
92
assisting and augmenting the physicians and dentists in
treating human ailments.
Support services are those services that are
necessary to direct and support the mission of the
medical facility. This account is somewhat like an
overhead account in a manufacturing firm. It summarizes
all operating expenses for support services, including
depreciation.
The last functional category, Special
Programs, represents those activities performed to
support the MTF's military mission rather than direct
patient care.
Functional categories represent the broadest
category for aggregating costs and they appear highest on
the accounting hierarchy. Each of the functional
categories is further divided into summary accounts and
subaccounts. The subaccounts are accumulated into their
corresponding summary account. An example of this
hierarchical arrangement appears:
Level I - Inpatient Care (Functional Category)
Level II - Medical Care (Summary Account)
Level III - Internal Medicine (Subaccount)
There are four elements that are generally
common to each MEPR account regardless of the level of
the hierarchy. The first element is termed "function."
The function contains a description of the type of
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activity characteristic of the particular account. The
second element is entitled "costs." This element
identifies the expenses that shall be included in the
account. "Performance factor" is the third element of the
account, and it identifies the uniform workload measure
which is to be collected and used for evaluating or
gauging performance. The final element is the
"assignment procedure." This elements establishes the
basis under which the account cost will be reassigned if
applicable. [Ref. 28:p. 81]
Having knowledge of the chart of accounts
structure and common generic elements, facilitates one's
understanding of the flow of expenses in MTFs. In brief,
each element of expense generated within the MTF is
assigned to a particular subaccount (work center) . The
sum of the expenses in each subaccount represent the
total expenses for each summary account, and the sum of
the expenses in each summary account represents the total
expenses for each functional category. The functional
categories of Inpatient Care, Ambulatory Care, Dental
Care, and Special Programs constitute final operating
expense accounts, which are the final expense
accumulation points in the systems. Ancillary Services
and Support Services accounts are intermediate operating
expense accounts whose expenses are reassigned to one of
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the final operating expense accounts through the use of a
stepdown allocation process.
b. Manpower and Expense Assignment
The purpose of the "Manpower and Expense
Assignment" is to transform manpower, expense, and
workload data collected by work centers into meaningful
management reports. It has the objective of defining a
basis for distributing the accumulated costs and work-
months to the direct patient care and Special Program
accounts. In other words, through the use of a
sequential stepdown cost allocation process all
subaccount, summary and intermediate expenses are placed
in the final functional account responsible for incurring
the expense or using the manhours.
The stepdown assignment methodology requires
five sequential steps to be taken. They are:
1. manpower and data collection and processing,
2. assignment of expenses and workload recording,
3. pre-stepdown purification of expenses,
4. assignment of expenses to final operating expense
accounts, and
5. pos t-stepdown purification of final operating
expense accounts.
At the manpower data collection and
processing stage two substeps are performed. First, one
establishes what amount of full-time equivalent (FTE)
work months are to be charged to each account. Next, one
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determines the appropriate military personnel expense and
the command, management, and administration expense each
account should be charged.
Civilian personnel salary expenses for the
command is calculated on a monthly basis. This expense
consists of the amount of funds obligated due to the
employment of each employee during a month. It includes,
but is not limited to, basic salary, incentive and
hazardous pay, government contributions to benefits,
overtime, and termination pay. The salary expense for
each employee is charged to the appropriate account based
upon the distribution of FTE work months determined in
the preceding paragraph.
Military salary expenses are charged in the
same manner as civilian salary expense. The amount of
expense to be distributed for each military member is
derived from the DOD Annual Composite Standard Rates
Table, which is published by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) . The amount to be
charged to each account is derived by multiplying the
standard rate for a member's grade and military
department times the allocated FTE work month. A more
detailed discussion of the distribution of FTE work
months and salary expense are provided in the MEPR
Manual.
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The assignment of expenses and workload
recording has three phases. The first phase consists of
assigning all non-personnel expenses to the intermediate
and final operating expense accounts. These expenses
come from the DOD Operation and Maintenance Appropriation
(0,M&N) , and they are usually related to program element
eight, "Care in Defense Facilities." However, any
expenses originating from other DOD program elements that
are incurred in direct support of a MTF are also
included. With the exception of indirect expenses, all
non-personnel expenses are accumulated and summarized in
the MTF s job order accounting system. Indirect expenses
are allocated to indirect cost pools when it is difficult
to identify the work center responsible for the incurring
the expense. These cost pools may include both personnel
and non-personnel related expenses.
The second phase of expense assignment deals
with depreciation expense. As stated in the MEPR Manual,
the costs for modernization and replacement of investment
equipment is funded from Other Procurement Navy
Appropriation (OPN) when costs are more than $5,000 and
directly support a MTF. Depreciation is on a straight
line basis using an eight-year moving average. In
addition, the manual states these costs will be treated
as an indirect expense during the stepdown reassignment
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process rather than as a direct expense at the time of
acquisition.
The final phase of expense assignment
involves the compilation of the performance data. Such
information is necessary for the assignment of
intermediate operating expense accounts and indirect cost
pools to final operating accounts.
The third step, pre-stepdown purification of
expenses , allocates expenses not previously allocated in
steps one and two. These expenses are allocated to
Support Services and Ancillary Services accounts,
provided there is no overhead included in the expense.
If overhead is included in the expenses, these expenses
are not allocated until one reaches step four in the
assignment process. Upon completion of step three,
performance data for each operating expense account and
expense applicable to the operation of the MTF have been
compiled.
The next step, assignment of expenses to
final expense accounts , involves the reassignment of
expenses from intermediate operating accounts (Support
and Ancillary Services) and indirect cost pools (wards
and clinics) to the final operating accounts. The result
of this process is the identification of direct patient




The stepdown process begins with the
allocation of expenses that have been assigned to the
intermediate operating expense accounts. These expenses
are allocated to other intermediate operating expense
accounts and final work center subaccounts in which
services were rendered. The prescribed allocation
sequence and assignment of these expenses is outlined in
the MEPR Manual. In general, however, the intermediate
operating accounts that render the most services to other
center (intermediate and final operating expense
accounts) are assigned first, and the intermediate
accounts that receive the most services from others are
assigned last.
The assignment of indirect cost pools is the
next phase of the fourth step. Indirect cost pools are
pseudo-final operating expense accounts in that they have
assigned to them the expenses from all Support Services
accounts, except depreciation. These expense are
assigned to the appropriate work center accounts based on
a ratio of workload generated by each receiving account
to the total workload of the indirect cost pool. After
completion of this step, only the subaccounts of the
final operating accounts contain expense data.
Step five, post-stepdown purification of
final operating expense accounts , reallocates final
operating expenses based on the performance factor or
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other unit of service outlined in the MEPR Manual. In
some cases, a MTF can reallocate these expenses based on
some consistently applied local costing practice. Upon
completion of the fifth step, the assignment of expenses
and workload recording, expenses contained in each
account can be aggregated into its appropriate summary
accounts and functional categories,
c. Reporting Requirements
While there are eight reports created from
the MEPR process, the primary vehicle used by activities
to determine "how well they have gotten the job done" is
the DOD Medical Expense and Performance Report. It
provides managers with aggregate expense and workload
data in three general areas: inpatient care, ambulatory
care, and special programs.
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IV. DESCRIPTION OF THE ANALYSIS
A. DATA
Data used in this thesis were provided by a Tri-
Service DRG Study Group at the U.S. Army Health Care
Studies and Clinical Investigation Activity, Fort Sam
Houston, Texas, and by the Naval Medical Command,
Washington, D.C. The sample population selected for
analysis consists of three naval hospitals: Charleston,
Long Beach, and Pensacola. The operational bed capacity
of these three naval treatment facilities (NTFs) was 223,
166, and 135, with Charleston being the largest naval
hospital and Pensacola being the smallest NTF. These
three hospitals were selected as the sample population
because:
* They have only minimal teaching responsibilities, if
any;
* They are located in urban areas;
* Their beneficiary population appear similar; and
* The number of inpatient discharges at each NTF is
relatively stable from year to year, yet offer
somewhat different relevant ranges of activities.
There are two primary categories of data used in this
thesis: (1) biometric data (inpatient discharges) and (2)
expense data. The biometric data were provided by the
Tri-Service DRG Study Group and the expense data by the
Naval Medical Command. The biometric data contain
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information for 60,408 inpatient discharges over a two-
year period (FY83 and FY84) for three hospitals. The







* Type of Admission
* Sex
* Disposition Code
* Military Treatment Facility
The authors also gathered information pertaining to
inpatient discharges from the DOD ' s cost accounting
reporting system, called the Medical Expense and
Performance Reporting System for Fixed Military Medical
and Dental Treatment Facilities (MEPR) in order to check
the accuracy of the inpatient biometric data.
The historical financial (expense) data were also
drawn from the MEPR. In total, the MEPR produces eight
cost accounting type reports. The primary report used in
this thesis to determine "how well NTFs got the job done"
was the Medical Expense and Performance Report. The
primary category of information drawn from this report was
the amount each NTF expended for inpatient care in its
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facility. Although we had access to four fiscal years
(FY82 through FY85) of expense data and had hoped to
conduct this analysis using three years of data, we only
used cost accounting information from two fiscal years
(FY83 and FY84)
.
The reason for limiting the analysis to
two fiscal years instead of three, revolved around the
problem of attaining accurate and complete FY85 biometric
data. The authors decided it would be better to have two
years of data that were complete and accurate than have a
third year of data that consisted of incomplete and
inaccurate biometric data, which might lead to erroneous
conclusions.
B. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Before discussing the specifics of our research
methods, let us first briefly describe our research
hypothesis. Initially, we had hoped that we might be able
to support the hypothesis that NTFs were operated more
efficiently than similar civilian facilities.
Unfortunately, two facts were borne out as we progressed
with the analysis: First, there are no similar civilian
hospitals, that is, the organizat ion--pr ocess and
structure—of these two types of hospitals (civilian and
naval) is markedly different. In fact, so different that
a vis-a-vis categorical comparison between types of
facilities is ostensibly impossible. Second, military
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treatment facilities, particularly NTFs, have unique
mission-driven operational and tactical requirements that
effectively preclude a categorical one-to-one, civilian-
to-naval hospital comparison of relative efficiencies.
Also, admittedly (and perhaps somewhat presumably) the
level of effectiveness (quality of care) between these two
types of facilities is treated as if it were similar.
As we progressed with our analysis we realized that,
despite the uniqueness of NTFs and their seemingly
incomparable differences with civilian hospitals, there
are striking similarities: They both use manpower,
facilities, equipment, and supplies in a transformation
process that provides products, which consist of a group
of services, to patients. Accordingly, rather than making
a categorical statement that these types of facilities are
similar and that one is more or less efficient than the
other, we decided to test in a rather direct and
fundamental manner the research hypothesis that NTFs 1
inpatient care expenses are less than the funding which
civilian hospitals would have received under Public Law
98-21.
The method used to test the null hypothesis that NTFs 1
inpatient care expenses were greater than or equal to the
funding levels a civilian hospital would have received
under P.L. 98-21 consists of four essential steps:
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1. Determine the number and type of DRG discharges in
each NTF for each fiscal year;
2. Determine the aggregate funding that each NTF
would have received if they were being reimbursed
under the parameters of P.L. 98-21;
3. Determine each NTF's actual inpatient care
expenses for each fiscal year; and
4. Compare these actual expenses to the constructed
Medicare reimbursement.
Step one, determining the number and type of DRG
discharges in each NTF, was primarily accomplished by the
Tri-Service DRG Study Group at Fort Sam Houston, TX. The
authors requested that historical biometric data
(inpatient discharge information) for each of the three
naval hospitals be provided for FY83 through FY85. As
requested, the Study Group's senior statistician compiled
the information, assigning inpatient discharges contained
in this data to appropriate DRG categories. After each
inpatient discharge had been assigned to the appropriate
DRG category, we determined the frequency of each DRG
discharge and the total DRG workload. This was
accomplished through the use of two computer software
packages. We used SPSS-X to determine the frequency of
each DRG, and Lotus 1-2-3 to ascertain the total DRG
workload for each NTF. The results of step one are
presented in Appendices D and E.
In order to accomplish step two, determining the
amount of funding NTFs would receive if they were being
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funded on the basis of the parameters of P.L. 98-21, we
needed three essential pieces of information. First, we
needed to know the frequency and grand total of each DRG
discharge in each NTF for each fiscal year under analysis.
This information was provided in the first step of the
research method. The other two pieces of essential
information needed to test the null hypothesis—HCFA cost
weights and the national federal payment rate--were
obtained from the Federal Register. A detailed discussion
of HCFA cost weights and national federal payment rates is
contained in Chapter III and Appendix A. The cost weights
used in our thesis are presented in Appendices C, D, and
E. The national federal payment rate used was $2837.91
per DRG discharge, as can been seen in our calculations in
Appendices D and E.
The technique used to determine the revenue NTFs would
have received under P.L. 98-21 is the reimbursement method
that Medicare mandates to be used by all health care
providers after fiscal year 1986. This technique uses a
national standard payment rate, also known as average
adjusted cost per discharge, in its calculation of
Medicare reimbursement without regard to hospital-unique
cost characteristics. As explained in the prospective
payment section in Chapter III, P.L. 98-21 establishes a
reimbursement method to be used in the transition years
(FY84, FY85, and FY86), and a method to be used in the
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years following the transition period. The former method
uses a payment rate that is made up of a hospital-specific
portion, a federal-regional portion, and a federal-
national portion, and was determined to add little to this
research. Therefore, we decided that, without loss of
generality, we could use the reimbursement method
specified for FY87 and subsequent years. To determine the
amount of revenue a hospital would have received using the
procedure outlined in step two, one must perform the
following procedures:
(a) Determine the total number of inpatient discharges
in each DRG category;
(b) Multiply the total frequency of each discharge by
the cost weight for that DRG category;
(c) Multiply the results of procedures (a) and (b) by
the national federal payment rate; and
(d) Sum the results of procedure (c)
.
TOTAL \ Number of DRG National
MEDICARE = \ DRG X Cost X Federal
REIMBURSEMENT / Discharges Weight Rate
The third step, determining each NTF ' s actual
inpatient care expenses for the two fiscal years under
study, required the extraction of expense data from the
MEPR. Again, the MEPR is an expense-linked cost
accounting system, which standardizes cost and performance
reporting through the use of fundamental (# of
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procedures), derived (cost per visit), and fiat
(depreciation) measures.
The primary data drawn from the MEPR was the total
inpatient care expense, clinician salaries, and the number
of dispositions each NTF reported in its quarterly report,
the Medical Expense and Performance Report. As discussed
in Chapter III, inpatient expenses reported in the
quarterly report represent the total cost of inpatient
care delivered in a NTF. This being the case, we removed
clinician (physician) salaries (both military and
civilian) from the aggregate inpatient care expense totals
since physician salaries are not usually included in the
standard Medicare reimbursement rate. By backing out
clinician salaries, we improved the relevance of our
analysis in making comparisons of military and civilian
health care data.
In addition to the adjustment made for clinician
salaries, we also normalized FY83 inpatient care expenses
to FY84 expense levels. This was done by multiplying the
FY83 inpatient care expenses, less clinician salaries, for
each NTF by nine percent, the growth rate of health care
expenditures for that year [Ref. 29:p. 30]. The authors
utilized this procedure so that FY84 cost weights and the
federal reimbursement rates could be applied to FY83
expense data. Again, since there were no cost weights or
federal reimbursement rates established for FY83, we
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utilized this procedure so that FY84 cost weights and the
federal reimbursement rate for FY84 could be legitimately
applied to FY83 expense data.
The final step of the research method, comparing
actual expenses to the funding NTFs would have received
had they been funded on the basis of the parameters of
P.L. 98-21, was accomplished through the use of the Lotus
spreadsheet software program. The results are illustrated
and discussed in the last section of this chapter.
Once the primary research question had been answered
we extended the use of our research methodology to a
comparison of inpatient care expenses with those in
Veterans Administration facilities (VAFs) . We used the
same methodology as discussed earlier with one exception.
We used a standard payment rate of $2775.00, the average
adjusted cost per discharge in VAFs in FY84, instead of
the national Medicare reimbursement rate of $2837.91 [Ref.
30 :p. 25]. The method used to determine the VA average
adjusted cost per discharge appeared to be consistent with
the method used by Medicare. The VA average adjusted cost
per discharge included direct, indirect, and education
expenditures and stipends paid to residents [Ref. 30:p.
25]. Also, the VA removed physician salaries from the
average adjusted cost per discharge.
Finally, in order to determine how similar inpatient
discharges were in the sample population, we compared the
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thirty most frequent DRG discharges in each NTF. We also
compared the NTFs 1 and the State of California's thirty
most frequent DRGs, using the same methodology.
C. FINDINGS
The results of the analysis are divided into three
parts: (1) A comparison of inpatient care expense levels
in NTFs to Medicare reimbursement levels civilian
hospitals would receive under the parameters of P.L. 98-21
for the workload performed in the NTFs; (2) A comparison
of NTFs'and VAFs 1 inpatient care expenses per fiscal year;
and (3) an analysis of the similarity of DRG discharges
between each NTF.
1. Comparison of Naval Treatment Facilities Expense
Levels to Medicare Reimbursement Levels
First, consider the summary results of our
analysis presented in Tables VI, VII, VIII, and Figures
4-1, 4-2, 4-3, and 4-4 (and supported in detail by
Appendices D, E, and F) . In reference to the figures,
"unfunded workload" indicates the difference between what
Medicare would have paid and what the NTFs actually
expended to provide inpatient care. "Funded workload then
is what the NTFs actually expended to provide inpatient
care. Our analysis indicates that annual inpatient
operating expenses in the sample population of NTFs is
notably less than the funding they would have received
under Medicare.
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Percentage of Funded and Unfunded Workload for Charleston,
Long Beach, and Pensacola Noval Hospitals for FY 1983
Figure 4-1
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Percentage of Funded ond Unfunded Workload for Charleston,
Long Beach, ond Pensecolo Novel Hospitals for FY 1984
Figure 4-2
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Percentage of Funded and Unfunded Workload for Charleston,
Long Beach, and Pensacola Naval Hospitals for FYs 83/84
Figure 4-3
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Total Percentage of Funded and Unfunded Workload
31.33*
Aggregate Percentage of Funded and Unfunded Workload for




As depicted in Table VI, if one uses Medicare
reimbursement rates, HCFA cost weights, and DRGs to
determine annual inpatient funding for Charleston, Long
Beach, and Pensacola naval hospitals in FY83 and FY84,
collectively they would have received an additional
$36,145,661. The aggregate MEPR inpatient expense total
for the three NTFs is $77,341,480, which is 31.9 percent
below the Medicare reimbursement level of $113,487,141.
In FY83, the aggregate inpatient expense total
(illustrated in Table VII and Figure 4-1) for Charleston,
Long Beach, and Pensacola naval hospitals is 30.1 percent
($16,913,745) below Medicare reimbursement levels; the
FY84 total inpatient expenses (illustrated in Table VIII
and Figure 4-2) is $19,231,916 (33.6 percent) below that
year's Medicare reimbursement level of $57,289,691.
As shown in the previous illustrations, in both
FY83 and FY84, Naval Hospital Charleston has the greatest
difference between MEPR expense and potential Medicare
reimbursement levels. If one uses the parameters of P.L.
98-21 to fund Charleston, it would receive an additional
$9,870,566 in FY83 and an additional $9,295,626 in FY84.
Charleston is followed by the Naval Hospital Pensacola
with an unfunded workload of 30.8 percent ($4,375,815) in
FY83 and 35.1 percent ($5,151,253) in FY84. The Naval
Hospital Long Beach has the smallest difference between
MEPR expense and Medicare reimbursement levels
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TABLE VI
SUMMARY OF FYs83/84 AGGREGATE INPATIENT MEPR/MEDICARE DATA
FOR CHARLESTON, LONG BEACH, AND PENSACOLA NAVAL HOSPITALS
HI£ Charleston long 9eg<;h Pensocolo Aggregate
FYS83/84
MEPR $28,507,786 $29,444,247 $19,389,447 $77,341,480
FYS83/84
MEDICARE $47,673,978 $36,896,645 $28,916,518 $113,487,141
FY383/84
Unfunded
Workload ($19,166,192) ($7,452,398) ($9,527,071) ($36,145,661)
FYS83/84
Percent
Unfunded 40.20$ 20.20% 32.95% 31.85%
115
TABLE VII
FY 1983 INPATIEm" MEPR/MEDICARE DATA FOR CHARLESTON, L0N6
BEACH, AND PENSACOLA NAVAL HOSPITALS
WTF Charleston Long 8eoch Pensacola Aggregate
FY83
MEPR $14,271,344 $15,164,893 $9,847,468 $39,283,705
FY83
MEDICARE $24,141,910 $17,832,254 $14,223,286 $56,197,450
FY83
Unfunded
Workload ($9,870,566) ($2,667,361) ($4,375,818) ($16,913,745)
FY83
Percent
Unfunded 40.89* 14.96* 30.77* 30.1*
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(illustrated in Tables VII and VIII). Nevertheless, it
would receive additional funding in each fiscal year. In
FY83 , Naval Hospital Long Beach would receive an
additional $2,667,361 and, in FY84, an additional
$4,785,037.
Our analysis uncovered an inconsistent factor
relating to inpatient discharge workload. There appears
to be a consistent 2.5 percent difference between the
number of dispositions reported in each NTF ' s Medical
Expense and Performance Report, and the number of DRG
discharges contained in the biometric data. We were
unable to determine the exact cause for this occurrence.
The Tri-Service DRG Study Group senior statistician
suggested the reason could be because one set of the data
is patient-specific (biometric data) , while the other set
of data (MEPR) is NTF-specif ic (aggregate data) . We
elected to use the biometric data for our calculations
since it appears to represent a more accurate one-to-one,
input-output relationship. However, had we used the other
set of data (MEPR dispositions), it would not have
significantly affected the findings.
2 . Comparison of Naval Treatment Facilities to
Veterans Administration Facilities
The comparison of NTFs ' inpatient care expenses to
VAFs' inpatient care expenses revealed findings consistent
with those of the primary research question. If one uses
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TABLE VIII
FY 1984 INPATIENT MEPR/MEDICARE DATA FOR CHARLESTON, LONG
BEACH, AND PENSACOLA NAVAL HOSPITALS
NTF Charleston Long Beach P^nsacola Aggregate
FY84
MEPR $14,236,442 $14,279,354 $9,541,979 $38,057,775
FY84
MEDICARE $23,532,068 $19,064,391 $14,693,232 $57,289,691
FY84
Unfunded
Workload ($9,295,626) ($4,785,037) ($5,151,253) ($19,231,916)
FY84
Percent
Unfunded 39.503 25.103 35.063 33.63
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FY84 VAFs' average adjusted cost per discharge, HCFA cost
weights, and DRGs to determine annual inpatient funding
for Charleston, Long Beach, and Pensacola naval hospitals
in FY83 and FY84, these hospitals would have received more
money. Specifically, as illustrated by Table IX, they
would have received $15,667,975 in FY83 and $18,287,651 in
FY84. Similar to the previous Medicare results, the
largest difference between MEPR expense and potential VAFs
expense levels was seen in the Naval Hospital Charleston,
followed by Pensacola, and finally, Long Beach.
3. Analysis of the Similarity of Diagnosis
Related Groups
A subsidiary finding was that the thirty most
frequent DRGs in each NTF from FY83 to FY84 varied only 23
percent. In fact, when comparing the biometric data, each
NTF experienced 77 percent of the same thirty most
frequent DRGs in FY84 as it did in FY83. What this tends
to point out is that the case mix is relatively stable
from one year to the next within the same facility.
Furthermore, this finding suggests that a stable
beneficiary population, coupled with a consistent
availability and use of hospital and physician services,
would manifest itself in a rather homogeneous range of
case mixes from one year to the next.
Moreover, although there are 470 DRGs, these
thirty most frequent DRGs in FY84 account for 58.2, 56.6,
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TABLE IX
SUMMARY OF FYs83, 84 AND AGGREGATE INPATIENT MEPR/VAFs
DATA FOR CHARLESTON, LONG BEACH, AND PENSACOLA NAVAL
HOSPITALS
FY 1963 DATA :
HJ1 Charleston Long Beach Pensocolo Aggregate
MEPR $14,271,344 $13,164,893 $9,847,468 $39,283,705
VAFS $23,606,739 $17,436,933 $13,907,988 $54,931,680
Unfunded
Workload ($9,335,395) ($2,272,060) ($4,060,320) ($15,667,975)
Percent
Unfunded 39258 13#3 29.2* 2829






Workload ($8,773,973) ($4,362,423) ($5,151,255) ($18,287,651)
Percent
Unfunded 38.158 23.458 35.158 32258
FY383/84 DATA:
MEPR $28507,786 $29,444,247 $19,389,447 $77,341,480
VAFs $46,617,154 $36,078,730 $28,601,222 $111,297,106
Unfunded
Workload ($1 8,1 09,368) ($6,634,483) ($9,211,775) ($33,955,626)
Percent
Unfunded 38.858 18.458 32258 30258
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and 55.1 percent of the total workload at Charleston, Long
Beach, and Pensacola naval hospitals, respectively.
Next, in contrasting the thirty most frequent DRG
in these three NTFs to those in California's hospitals,
one finds considerable variation in the inpatient case
mix. Using FY84 data, Charleston, Long Beach, and
Pensacola naval hospitals' case mix differs from that of
California's hospitals by 73, 70, and 70 percent,
respectively, as depicted in Table X. This finding
indicates the typical case mix which comprises the bulk of
the workload differs considerably between the NTFs' and
California's hospitals. If California's hospitals treat
the "average-type" patient, one could surmise that the
NTFs treat rather "atypical" case mixes. That is, the
nature of NTFs services and products are somewhat
different than that found in the civilian sector.
When contrasting the NTFs to one another, however,
the case-mix variation is not as great as it is between
the NTFs and California's hospitals. In fact, in FY84,
of the thirty most frequent DRGs, 70 percent are common
(i.e., only 30 percent are different) between Naval
Hospital Charleston and Naval Hospital Pensacola, 47
percent are similar between Naval Hospital Long Beach and
Naval Hospital Pensacola, and 57 percent are shared




THIRTY MOST FREQUENT DIAGNOSIS RELATED 6R0UPs IN THREE NTFs
AND IN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA HOSPITALS FOR FY 1904
DR6
Ranking Charleston Lonq Beach Pensacolo California*
1 391 391 391 391
2 373 373 373 373
3 438 436 371 371
4 62 243 62 243
5 371 254 438 390
6 372 371 383 127
7 234 162 355 182
8 381 232 162 369
9 56 234 183 355
10 383 56 468 430
11 390 183 436 468
12 355 249 140 140
13 243 383 234 14
14 162 428 372 89
15 254 381 98 88
16 39 390 143 96
17 143 184 381 122
10 183 98 167 294
19 374 427 262 438
20 359 389 198 215
21 466 97 122 82
22 428 281 270 209
23 232 297 40 148
24 40 426 243 210
25 140 25 39 121
26 97 374 222 154
27 270 468 361 106
28 198 167 467 110
29 184 222 158 1
30 122 364 337 386
Source : "Utilization and Charges By DftG For California: hdividual Hopsital Discharge Data/ Health
Systems Agency 8: Mid-Coast, July 1985, Catifomia Health Facilities Commission.
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What these findings primarily suggest is that the
thirty most frequent (and potentially resource consuming)
DRGs vary much more between the NTFs and California's
hospitals than they do among NTFs. Accordingly, the
findings support the assertion that inpatient case mix
among NTFs is more similar than it is compared to a
typical civilian hospital's inpatient case mix (i.e.,
naval hospitals treat somewhat different types/categories
of inpatients than civilians, and these types of patients
are common to naval hospitals, in general)
.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The focus of this research effort was to: (1)
investigate whether a feasible and meaningful comparison
could be made between NTF expenditures in a given fiscal
year for inpatient care and the amount civilian hospitals
would have been reimbursed by Medicare had they
experienced a similar inpatient workload as that of NTFs
using DRGs; and, (2) if possible, develop an actual model
that would facilitate this comparison using real workload
data. Our analysis suggests the following conclusions:
1. Biometric and actual expense data are available,
which allow interested researchers to make relative and
meaningful comparisons between NTFs and Medicare's
reimbursement provisions . The Medical Expense and
Performance Reporting System for Fixed Military Medical
and Dental Treatment Facilities (MEPR) uses step-down
procedures that capture all relevant inpatient expenses
for each NTF. Because these inpatient expenses can be
readily identified and are isolated from other facility
operations and programs, one can make definitive
statements concerning the aggregate facility inpatient
costs. Additionally, if existing discharge summary data
can be transformed into biometric data, such as the
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authors were able to obtain for this analysis, one can




If compensated for inpatient care in a manner
similar to civilian hospitals under Medicare, these three
naval hospitals would have collectively received 31.9
percent more than their actual expenses, or over
$6,000,000 each per year .
As discussed in Chapter IV, the MEPR expense data
contrasted to Medicare reimbursable amounts, which again
are based on the NTFs' workload, indicate that each of the
three naval hospitals over the two-year period would have
received from a low of 20.2 percent to a high of 40.2
percent more than their actual inpatient expenses, or,
expressed in dollar amounts, from a low of $7,452,398 to a
high of $19,166,192 more.
3. When the Veterans Administration's average
adjusted cost per discharge, HCFA cost weights, and the
ICD-9-CM DRGs are utilized to determine reimbursable
amounts for the three NTFs used in this analysis, they
would have received 30.5 percent more than their actual
expenses, or approximately $5,650,000 each per year .
The VA has asserted in recent months that it
provides inpatient care (almost) as efficiently as
civilian hospitals. While our research does not address
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whether the VA costs per DRG discharge and Medicare
reimbursable amounts are approximately equal, the three
NTFs used in this analysis would have received over
$33,000,000 more than actual associated expenses had the
VA average adjusted cost per discharge been used in
calculating reimbursable amounts.
4. In analyzing the biometric data and comparing the
thirty most frequent DRGs, the authors found there to be
much greater similarity of case mix among the three NTFs,
themselves, as well as within the same NTF from one year
to the next (FY83 to FY84) , than between the NTFs' and the
State of California's thirty most frequent DRGs .
The analysis indicates that the thirty most
frequent DRGs for each NTF varied only 23 percent from
FY83 to FY84. In other words, using Naval Hospital Long
Beach as an example, of the thirty most frequent DRGs in
FY83 exactly 77 percent of these DRGs were among its
thirty most frequent DRGs in FY84. This suggests that the
case mix is relatively stable for a NTF from one year to
the next, as would be expected for NTFs that serve a well
defined beneficiary population having a consistent case
mix. Of course, case mix is largely dependent not only
upon patients' demands but also available medical/surgical
services and physician capabilities. Undoubtedly, if the
available capabilities changed so would the nature of the
services and products; ergo, the case mix would differ.
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The comparison among NTFs in FY84, however,
revealed somewhat lower levels of similarity than that
found at each NTF (from one year to the next) . In fact,
similarity of the thirty most frequent DRGs between NTFs
ranged from a high of 70 percent between Naval Hospital
Charleston and Naval Hospital Pensacola to a low of 47
percent between Naval Hospital Long Beach and Naval
Hospital Pensacola. Although this finding indicates there
is not as much similarity of case mix between NTFs as
found at a single NTF from one year to the next, the
variability is considerably less than that between the
NTFs 1 thirty most frequent DRGs and that of the State of
California's, which varied 71 percent. This, in turn,
suggests that the case mix among NTFs is much more similar
than that found between NTFs and the civilian sector.
Accordingly, one can deduce that the beneficiary
population case mix for each NTF, itself, is more
homogeneous than that among NTFs. Moreover, the
beneficiary population case mix between the NTFs 1 and
California's can perhaps best be characterized as being
almost hetergeneous (i.e., case mix varies so much between
the two that it appears as if the preponderance of
inpatient costs are for considerably different types of
cases)
.
The purpose of identifying the differences among
NTFs, themselves, and, in particular, between themselves
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and the DRGs for a large representative area such as
California, is to demonstrate case-mix measurements (using
DRG methods) provide a means, perhaps the best means, to
make meaningful comparisons and statements about what it
is hospitals produce. Although this conclusion is not
surprising and intuitively acceptable, its significance
lies in the fact that it enables a valid and relevant
comparison of output among hospitals, even when they
provide vastly different services and products.
5 . Our analysis suggests that either NTFs are more
efficient in providing inpatient care than that which is
provided in civilian hospitals or that HCFA/Medicare
reimbursement rates are too generous, or a combination
thereof .
We cannot decisively explain the disparity between
what NTFs would have received under Medicare's
reimbursement provisions and what expenses were actually
incurred. As with any analysis that depends upon non-
experimental raw data, erroneous findings and conclusions
may be drawn from data that are inaccurate, incomplete, or
wrongly applied. The authors, however, have gone to great
strides to ensure that the data employed for this analysis
are highly accurate, complete, and applied correctly for
testing the research hypothesis; therefore, the results of
this analysis are preliminary but nonetheless suggest that
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NTFs do in fact provide efficient inpatient care, perhaps
even more efficiently than the average civilian hospital.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are based on this
research effort.
1. Further analysis be conducted to test the research
hypothesis.
Although the findings of this thesis are
consistent and fully support the research hypothesis, the
authors believe a follow-on analysis comprised of a larger
sample population from several years with the most current
cost weights would confirm the findings of this thesis.
2. Consideration should be given to incorporating DRG
methods in assessing NTFs inpatient workload efficiency
and productivity .
Since DRGs enable hospitals to identify and
measure their products more effectively and accurately it
seems only logical that a case-mix approach be employed
for assessing hospital efficiency and productivity.
Rather than utilizing exclusively such surrogate measures
of output as occupied bed days, number of admissions, or
number of operating room procedures, a case-mix patient
classification system would provide a superior means of
identifying what has been produced and how efficiently it
has been produced.
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3. Similar consideration should be given to
incorporating DRG methods into the resource allocation and
decision-making process .
Because DRG case-mix methods enable more precise
product identification, resource allocation methods should
incorporate funding levels that are predicated on what is
actually provided or produced. In developing the resource
allocation method, provision should be made for
identifying controllable and uncontrollable inpatient
costs and for designing incentives into the overall naval
health care delivery system for effectiveness as well as
efficiency.
4 . The Naval Medical Command should consider
development and refinement of the DRG patient
classification system so that it can be tailored to meet
its needs .
It behooves the Naval Medical Command to examine
development of its own cost weights and average adjusted
cost per DRG discharge because of the somewhat atypical
case-mix groupings found in its NTFs. This is especially
true if it plans to apply this mechanism to productivity
and efficiency analysis and to the resource allocation
process. Admittedly, this would be a major undertaking
but the uses of such information are potentially profound.
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5. Before broad and irrevocable commitments or
decisions are made in the CHAMPUS Reform Initiative (CRD
the Department of Defense should consider that inpatient
care costs appear to be consistently and considerably less
than Medicare reimbursement amounts in three of its
Uniformed Services Medical Treatment Facilities .
Again, based on the preliminary findings, NTFs
appear to be able to provide considerably more inpatient
care at similar funding levels than either civilian or VA
hospitals. Because of this indication of efficiency
within the DoD health care delivery system, it behooves
DoD to maintain as much inpatient care "in-house" as is
consistent with overall operational goals. In particular,
DoD should strive to maintain "in-house" those case-mix
groupings (DRGs) that it can treat less expensively than
the contractor. Ideally, these would be the more complex
and r esou rce- intens ive medical and surgical cases.
However, whatever negotiated fixed price contracts for the
CRI are effected, they should reflect the case-mix




PROSPECTIVE REIMBURSEMENT UNDER P. L. 98-21
INTRODUCTION
This appendix attempts to provide additional detailed
information about "what does" and "does not" make up the
federal and hospital-specific portions of Medicare
reimbursement rates under Public Law 98-21. The intent of
this appendix is not to make the reader thoroughly versed
in Medicare prospective reimbursement. Rather, this
explanation is intended to provide a foundation for those
unfamiliar with Public Law 98-21 in order that an
understanding of the analysis methods contained in the
thesis might be better understood. Most of the
information contain in this appendix has been extracted
from the Federal Register [Ref. 27] and Grimaldi's and
Micheletti's book, Prospective Payment; The Definitive
Guide to Reimbursement [Ref. 1]
Federal Portion of the Prospective Payment Rate
The federal portion of the prospective payment rate is
based on the average cost per Medicare discharge. These
standardized costs, also referred to as adjusted payment
amounts, are developed for each DRG in the PPS. They are
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* Indirect Medical Education Costs Wage Adjustments
* Cost-of-Living Allowance Adjustments
* Budget Neutrality Parameters
* Patient and Cost Outlier Adjustments
* Medicare Part B Costs
* FICA Tax Adjustments
* Nonphysician Anesthetist Service
As discussed in Chapter III, the payment rate for each
DRG discharge is established on the basis of three sources
of data: the Medicare cost report, the Medicare discharge
file, and the MEDPAR file. During the transition period,
the federal portion of the adjusted payment amounts are
based on regional and national average payment rates. The
national rate is comprised on a single rate for urban
areas and a single rate for rural areas. The regional
rate is made up of 18 regional rates, one rate for each
urban and each rural area in each of the nation's nine
census divisions.
As the health care industry proceeds through the
three-year transition period, Medicare prospective rates
will increasingly depend on national rates and less on
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regional rates. Eventually, the national rates for urban
and rural areas will be the only adjusted payment rates
used by Medicare to reimburse hospitals.
A. COST-INPUT FACTORS
The discussion of cost-input factors in the subsequent
paragraphs attempts to better illustrate the cost
foundation on which the federal rate is based.
1. Base-Year Costs : As Figure 3-2 illustrates the
calculation of the standardized-payment amount begins with
the establishment of allowable inpatient operating
Medicare costs in the base year. Reported baseyear costs
are taken from calendar year 1981 Medicare cost reports.
These costs are subsequently modified as a result of the
inclusion of authorized adjustments and exclusions under
P.L 98-21. These costs include:
(a) capital-related items,
(b) approved direct medical educations programs,
(c) nonphysician anesthetist service,
(d) nursing differential, and
(e) routine costs in excess of Section 223 limits.
The net result is divided by the number of Medicare
discharges during the cost reporting period to obtain the
adjusted allowable cost per Medicare discharge.
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COST PER (Allowable Base-Year (Total
MEDICARE = Medicare Costs) + Adjustment)
DISCHARGE (Medicare Discharges)
2. Inflation Update ; The updating (inflation) factor
attempts to transform base-year costs into current-year
dollar terms. Adjusted base year costs are updated for
inflation expected to occur between the base and rate
years. First, the costs are updated to the fiscal year
ending September 30, 1983, so that cost reports covering
different periods can be expressed in comparable dollars.
Second, updated costs are increased, through September
1985, by the target percentage; the projected inflation in
the hospital market basket plus an allowance to improve
the intensity/quality of care is included in the standard
payment rate. One should note, however, there is no
retroactive adjustment made if there is variance between
actual and projected inflation.
3. Cost Standardization : Standardization of costs is
done to minimize the effects of certain factors on costs
so a comparison of hospital performance can be made on the
basis of product line (i.e., DRGs) . Inflation adjusted
cost per Medicare discharge are standardized for:
(a) differences in case mix among hospitals,
(b) indirect medical education costs,
(c) interhospital differences in wage levels, and
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(d) cost-of-living differences for Alaska and Hawaii
hospitals.
4. Case-Mix Adjustment : A case-mix index is used to
adjust for interhospital differences in the types of
inpatients treated. The index is derived from 1981 cost
and billing data. Case-mix complexity is said to vary
positively with the size of the index number. An index
greater (less) than one indicates that the case mix is
more (less) than average.
Case-mix indexes and DRG cost weights are based on
information obtained from the Medicare Provider Analysis
and Review (MEDPAR) cost reports. The MEDPAR file stores
20 percent of the bills that hospitals submit for payment
for inpatient services rendered to Medicare beneficiaries.
These sample bills contain the patient's age, length of
stay, diagnosis, and surgical procedure. This clinical
information is used by HCFA personnel to place Medicare
discharges into the appropriate DRG using the the 1CD-9-CM
coding methodology.
After patients are assigned to the appropriate
DRGs, the cost of their care is estimated. This involves
transforming hospital charges into costs of services
rendered. The information is obtained from the cost
report a hospital completes and submits to Medicare for
annual reimbursement determination. Cost reports contain
the routine and special care per diem costs and
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departmental cost-to-charge ratios needed to convert
charges into the costs of services received by Medicare
beneficiaries. Ratios and average costs derived from 1981
reports were used to calculate Medicare case-mix indexes
and DRG price indexes. Table V illustrates the steps
involved in calculating DRG cost weights and case-mix
indexes.
The cost of treating a Medicare patient assigned
to a DRG is calculated as follows:
(a) The cost of routine care is found by multiplying
the number of days the patients spent in a regular
room by the hospital routine cost per day;
(b) The cost of special care is found by multiplying
the days spent in a special care unit by the
hospital's special care cost per day; and
(c) The cost of ancillary care is found by multiplying
the charge of the service by the applicable cost-
to-charge ratio.
5. Indirect Medical Education Costs : An adjustment
is made for the tests, procedures, and other indirect
costs generated by the medical education programs. The
ratio of full-time equivalent (FTE) interns and residents
in approved programs to beds and the effects of teaching
activity on operating costs are used to standardize
indirect medical education costs. HCFA estimated the
effect teaching activity on operating costs to be 11.59
percent.
The adjustment for indirect medical education
costs is made by dividing the case-mix standardized cost
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per Medicare discharge by a hospital-specific education
multiple (EM), calculated as follows:
EM = [(Beds/FTEs)/0.1) x .1159] + 1.0
6. Wage Adjustment : The amount determined by the
adjustment for indirect medical education cost is divided
into labor and non-labor components, respectively. The
labor-related portion is then standardized for wage
differences among various hospitals.
7. Cost-of-Living Adjustment (Cola) : For Alaska and
Hawaii only, an adjustment is made for nonlabor costs due
to the relatively higher costs of living in these two
states. Similar to the labor component, nonlabor costs
are divided by the applicable adjustment factor.
8. Budget Neutrality : P.L. 98-21 mandates that in
fiscal years 1984 and 1985 the prospective payment system
be "budget neutral." Specifically, Medicare is mandated
not to spend any more or less than it would have under the
1982 TEFRA. If budget neutrality is violated, the federal
share of the amount involved is spread proportionately
among the DRGs.
9. Outliers : Additional payments expected to be made
for outlier patients are subtracted from the standardized
amounts developed thus far. Outliers are patients with
unusually long (day outliers) or costly (cost outliers)
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stays for a particular DRG. Day outliers are patients
whose length of stay exceeds the average (mean) stay for a
DRG by 22 days or 1.94 standard deviations, whichever
results in a smaller number of days. Cost outliers are
patients whose charges adjusted to costs exceed the DRG
payment rate by the larger of $13,000 or double the
relevant DRG payment rate.
10. Part B Costs . The standards are then adjusted
upwards for services previously billed under Part 8 but
now included in the DRG payment rates. This is
accomplished by multiplying the standards by 1.0013.
11. FICA Taxes : Similar to Part 8 costs, an upward
adjustment is made for the FICA taxes previously not paid
by certain hospitals. The multiplier for 1985 was 1.0018.
12. Nonphysician Anesthetists ; The costs of these
services are recognized by reducing the national
standardized amount by a specific percentage. In 1985,
Medicare adjusted the national standardized amount by 0.32
percent and the regional standardized amounts by 0.42
percent.
B. FEDERAL RATE CALCULATION
The payment applicable to a particular DRG can be
obtained by multiplying the overall standard rate, by the
cost weight (or DRG price index) associated with the DRG,
listed in Appendixes C, D, and E. The cost weights shown
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in Appendixes D and E apply to all participating hospitals
for each DRG. For example, if the national average
adjusted payment was $2,000 for each Medicare discharge
and the cost weight for a specific DRG discharge was 1.50,
the amount of revenue the hospital would receive would be
$3,000.
Hospital-Specific Portion of the Prospective Payment Rate
The hospital-specific portion of the prospective
payment rate is based on a hospital's historical cost
experience. For the first cost reporting period under the
PPS, a hospital-specific rate is calculated for each
hospital, derived generally from three cost-input factors:
(1) base-year costs, (2) case-mix index, and (3) updating
factor.
HOSPITAL
SPECIFIC = (Base-Year Costs) x Updating Factor
RATE (1981 Case-Mix Index)
1. Base Year Costs : Base-year costs for the hospital-
specific rate are derived in almost the same manner as
base-year costs for the federal rate. One additional
adjustment, however, is required in the determination of
the hospital-specific base-year costs. An adjustment is
made for higher costs resulting from changes in accounting
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principles initiated in the base-year and other actions
designed to raise base-year costs.
Base-year costs for most hospitals are derived
from cost data for the next to last year (or longer)
preceding the first cost reporting period subject to the
new PPS. In other words, the hospital-specific portion of
the payment rate is estimated from the twelve-month
Medicare cost period ending on or after September 30,
1982, and before September 30, 1983. Thus, if a
hospital's reporting period began October 1, 1983, its
base-year would be October 1, 1981 to September 30, 1982.
With certain exceptions, once base-year costs have been
established, they are generally applied throughout the
entire three year transition period.
2. Case-Mix Adjustment : This adjustment is made so
that case-mix changes occurring between the base and rate
years can be fully recognized in calculating aggregate
Medicare prospective payments. The adjustment cost per
Medicare discharge is divided by a hospital's case-mix
index.
3. Updating Factor : The updating factor attempts to
transform base-year costs into current-year dollar terms.
This being the case, case-mix adjustments are increased by
a target percentage, which equals projected inflation plus
an allowance to improve the intensity or quality of care
in the institution. If budget neutrality is violated,
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however, the target rate is adjusted so that Medicare
spends no more nor less under the prospective payment
system than it would have been spent under TEFRA.
Cost Exclusions and Adjustments
Certain historical allowable costs are excluded
from the calculation of a hospital's prospective payment
rates. Other historical costs are adjusted to make the
base year inpatient costs comparable to operating costs
covered by Medicare's prospective payment system. In
general, the exclusions and adjustments fall under the
following headings:
* capital-related costs
* direct medical education costs
* nonphysician anesthetists
* nursing differential
* malpractice insurance costs PICA adjustment
* Section 223 adjustment
* Part B costs
1. Capital-Related Cos'ts: These costs are
excluded from the prospective payment rates in FYs 84, 85,
and 86, and thev are reimbursed on a retrospectively-
determined reasonable cost basis . These costs include net
depreciation, leases and rentals, improvements, certain
interest and insurance expenses, and taxes. In the case
of investor-owned hospitals, these costs include a return-
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on-equity capital. (Under Medicare's prospective plan, the
return will be calculated by multiplying allowed equity
capital by the rate of interest the federal treasury pays
on loans from the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund)
.
Capital-related costs do not include repair or
maintenance cost, interest expense incurred to borrow
working capital, taxes paid on land or depreciable assets
not used for patient care, insurance that does not apply
to depreciable assets not used for patient care or the
payment of capital-related cost if business is
interrupted, and the costs of minor equipment that are
expensed rather than capitalized. Additionally, one
should note that hospitals are not permitted to change
their capitalization and expensing-of -assets policies
during the transition period.
2. Direct Medical Education Costs: These costs
are also excluded from the prospective rates and are
reimbursed on a retrospective, reasonable cost basis .
Approved educational activities consist of formally
organized or planned programs of study typically aimed at
enhancing the quality of care in the institution. These
activities may include nursing schools, radiologic
technologist schools, and the medical education of other
paraprofessionals. They do not include patient education,
general awareness programs for the community, and on-the-
job training.
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3. Nonphysician Anesthetists: The costs of
services rendered by certified nurse anesthetists (CRNAs)
and anesthesiologist assistants (AAs) are excluded from
the payment rates, and like capital-related and direct
medical education costs, are reimbursed on a
retrospective-cost basis . This exclusion is designed to
eliminate the incentive that hospitals have to substitute
higher-costing anesthesiologists for nonphysician
anesthetists when cost of CRNA or AA services are in the
rates. Since anesthesiologists can bill under Part B of
Medicare, hospitals could enhance their financial position
by having physicians administer anesthesia while CRNA or
AA costs are left in the payment rates. The exclusion
eliminates the potential "double payment."
4. Nursing Differential: TEFRA abolished the
nursing salary cost differential for general inpatient
routine services for cost reporting periods on or after
October 1, 1982. Thus, these costs are removed from the
base year in order to establish the prospective payment
amounts.
5. FICA Adjustment: Some hospitals did not pay
social security taxes during the base period, but they
were required to pay them beginning January 1, 1984. To
recognize this legally mandated increase in compensation
cost, an appropriate amount is added to the reported base-
year cost .
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6. Section 223 Adjustment: Since the mid-1970s
Medicare has imposed a limit (Section 223) on reimbursable
per diem costs for general impatient routine care. Costs
in excess of the limit are excluded from the calculation
of the standardized payment amounts.
7. Part B Costs: Prospective payment rates are
intended to cover all costs associated with covered
inpatient care furnished to Part A beneficiaries, except
physician services. Prior to P.L. 98-21 many nonphysician
services furnished to inpatients were billed under Part B
rather than Part A. For the most part, the new law
prohibits this practice for services rendered after
September 30, 1983. In other words, the payment rates
represent full payment for all covered nonphysician
inpatient services. These services must be supplied
either directly by the hospital or another entity under
arrangement made by the hospital. In order to compensate
for costs formerly billed under Part B, reported base-year
costs are adjusted upward by a specific target percentage.
HEALTH CARE PROVIDER EXCLUSIONS
Under P.L. 98-21 certain types of providers
are not subject to the prospective payment system but will
continue to be paid on a reasonable cost basis. Some of
the types of excluded providers are:
146
* children's hospitals,
* long term hospitals with an ALOS greater than 25
days,
* sole community hospitals (SCH)
* psychiatric and rehabilitation hospitals, and




DECISION TREES FOR THE ICD-9-CM DRGs









Source : The Revised ICD-9-CM Diagnosis Related Groups : Grouper User Manual (New Haven,
CT: Health Systems International). Adapted from Paul L. Grimaldi and Julie A. Micheletti,
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AND SELECTED RELATIVE WEIGHTS
ORE HOC TYPE TITLE
001 00J S CRANIOTOMY AGE )17 EXCEPT FOR TRAUMA
002 001 S CRANIOTOMY FOR TRAUMA AGE >I7
003 001 S CRANIOTOMY AGE (13
004 001 S SPINAL PROCEDURES
005 001 S EXTRACRANIAL VASCULAR PROCEDURES
006 001 S CARPAL TUNNEL RELEASE
007 001 S PERIPH t CRANIAL NERVE + OTHER NERV SYST PROC AGE >69 »/0R C. C.
008 001 S PERIPH + CRANIAL NERVE + OTHER NERV SYST PROC AGE (70 H/0 C. C.
009 001 M SPINAL DISORDERS INJURIES
010 001 n NERVOUS SYSTEM NEOPLASMS AGE >69 AND/OR C. C.
Oil 001 M NERVOUS SYSTEM NEOPLASMS AGE (70 W/0 C. C.
012 001 M DEGENERATIVE NERVOUS SYSTEM DISORDERS
013 001 M MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS + CEREBELLAR ATAXIA
014 001 M SPECIFIC CEREBROVASCULAR DISORDERS EXCEPT TIA
015 001 M TRANSIENT ISCHEMIC ATTACKS
01b 001 M NONSPECIFIC CEREBROVASCULAR DISORDERS WITH C. C.
017 001 M NONSPECIFIC CEREBROVASCULAR DISORDERS H/0 C. C.
018 001 M CRANIAL * PERIPHERAL NERVE DISORDERS AGE )69 AND/OR C. C.
01? 001 M CRANIAL PERIPHERAL NERVE DISORDERS AGE (70 H/0 C. C.
020 001 M NERVOUS SYSTEM INFECTION EXCEPT VIRAL MENINGITIS
021 001 M VIRAL MENINGITIS
022 001 M HYPERTENSIVE ENCEPHALOPATHY
023 001 M NONTRAUMATIC STUPOR + COMA
024 001 M SEIZURE > HEADACHE AGE >69 AND/OR C. C.
025 001 M SEIZURE + HEADACHE AGE 18-69 H/0 C. C.
026 001 M SEIZURE + HEADACHE AGE 0-17
027 001 M TRAUMATIC STUPOR COMA, COMAH HR
028 001 M TRAUMATIC STUPOR + COMA, COMA (1 HR AGE )69 AND/OR C. C.
02? 001 H TRAUMATIC STUPOR COMA (1 HR AGE 18-6? H/0 C. C.
030 001 M TRAUMATIC STUPOR * COMA (1 HR AGE 0-17
031 001 M CONCUSSION AGE >65 AND/OR C. C.
032 001 M CONCUSSION AGE 18 - 69 H/0 C. C.
033 001 M CONCUSSION AGE 0-17
034 001 H OTHER DISORDERS OF NERVOUS SYSTEM AGE )6? AND/OR C. C.
035 001 M OTHER DISORDERS OF NERVOUS SYSTEM AGE (70 H/0 C. C.
036 002 S RETINAL PROCEDURES
037 002 S ORBITAL PROCEDURES
038 002 S PRIMARY IRIS PROCEDURES
039 002 S LENS PROCEDURES
040 002 S EXTRAOCULAR PROCEDURES EXCEPT ORBIT AGE )17
041 002 S EXTRAOCULAR PROCEDURES EXCEPT ORBIT AGE 0-17
042 002 S INTRAOCULAR PROCEDURES EXCEPT RETINA, IRIS + LENS
043 002 H HYPHEMA
044 002 M ACUTE MAJOR EYE INFECTIONS
045 002 M NEUROLOGICAL EYE DISORDERS
046 002 N OTHER DISORDERS OF THE EYE AGE >17 WITH C.C
047 002 M OTHER DISORDERS OF THE EYE AGE >17 W/0 C.C
048 002 M OTHER DISORDERS OF THE EYE AGE 0-17
049 003 S HAJOR HEAD + NECK PROCEDURES































































DRG MDC TYPE TITLE HEIGHT ALOS OFF
SALIVARY GLAND PROCEDURES EXCEPT SIALOADENECTOMY .6702 4.2 15
CLEFT LIP + PALATE REPAIR 0.6488 3.8 11
SINUS MASTOID PROCEDURES AGE >17 0.5895 3.5 11
SINUS + MASTOID PROCEDURES AGE 0-17 0.6961 3.2 11
MISCELLANEOUS EAR, NOSE + THROAT PROCEDURES 0.4155 2.5 7
RHINOPLASTY 0.4144 2.8 8
T + A PROC EXCEPT TONSILLECTOMY +/0R ADENOMECTOMY AGE >17 0.5251 2.7 9
T + A PROC EXCEPT TONSILLECTOMY +/0R ADENCIDECTOMY AGE 0-17 0.313 1.5 3
TONSILLECTOMY AND/ OR ADENOIDECTOMY ONLY AGE )17 0.3147 2 4
TONSILLECTOMY AND/OR ADENOIDECTOMY ONLY AGE 0-17 0.2643 1.5 3
MYRINGOTOMY AGE )17 0.4273 2.1 9
MYRINGOTOMY AGE 0-17 0.3121 1.3 3
OTHER EAR, NOSE * THROAT O.R. PROCEDURES 1.109 5.8 26
EAR, NOSE + THROAT MALIGNANCY 1.0812 5.7 26
DISEQUILIBRIUM 0.4357 4.6 17
EPISTAXIS 0.4116 3.7 15
EPIGLOTTIS 0.6762 4.3 17
OTITIS MEDIA + URI AGE )69 AND/OR C. C. 0.6289 6 22
OTITIS MEDIA URI AGE 18-65 H/0 C. C. 0.5417 4.8 19
OTITIS MEDIA + URI AGE 0-17 0.3697 3.1 10
LARYNGOTRACHEITIS 0.3589 2.9 9
NASAL TRAUMA + DEFORMITY 0.4857 3.8 18
OTHER EAR, NOSE + THROAT DIAGNOSES AGE >17 0.5217 3.5 17
OTHER EAR, NOSE + THROAT DIAGNOSES AGE 0-17 0.3463 2.1 9
MAJOR CHEST PROCEDURES 2.6044 14.4 34
O.R. PROC ON THE RESP SYSTEH EXCEPT MAJOR CHEST WITH C. C. 1.8734 10.6 31
O.R. PROC ON THE RESP SYSTEM EXCEPT MAJOR CHEST H/0 C. C. 1.8178 9.5 30
PULMONARY EMBOLISM 1.4095 10.4 30
RESPIRATORY INFECTIONS t INFLAMMATIONS AGE >69 AND/OR C. C. 1.7932 11.2 31
RESPIRATORY INFECTIONS + INFLAMMATIONS AGE 18-69 H/0 C. C. 1.7445 10.9 31
RESPIRATORY INFECTIONS + INFLAMMATIONS AGE 0-17 0.8743 6.1 26
RESPIRATORY NEOPLASMS 1.14 7.4 27
HAJOR CHEST TRAUMA AGE >69 AND/OR C.C. 0.9809 8.1 28
MAJOR CHEST TRAUMA AGE (70 H/0 C. C. 0.7738 5.3 22
PLEURAL EFFUSION AGE >69 AND/OR C. C. 1.1461 8.4 28
PLEURAL EFFUSION AGE (70 H/0 C. C. 1.1217 7.6 28
PULMONARY EDEMA + RESPIRATORY FAILURE 1.5529 7.7 28
CHRONIC OBSTRUCTIVE PULMONARY DISEASE 1.0412 7.5 28
SIMPLE PNEUMONIA PLEURISY AGE )69 AND/OR C. C. 1.1029 8.5 29
SIMPLE PNEUMONIA + PLEURISY AGE 18-69 H/0 C. C. 0.9849 7.6 28
SIMPLE PNEUMONIA + PLEURISY AGE 0-17 0.5131 4.6 14
INTERSTITIAL LUNG DISEASE AGE >69 AND/OR C. C. 1.037 7.8 28
INTERSTITIAL LUNG DISEASE AGE (70 H/0 C. C. 0.9724 6.9 27
PNEUMOTHORAX AGE >69 AND/OR C. C. 1.4374 9.2 29
PNEUMOTHORAX AGE (70 H/0 C. C. 1.1252 7.7 28
BRONCHITIS ASTHMA AGE )69 AND/OR C. C. 0.7996 6.9 24
BRONCHITIS ASTHMA AGE 18-69 H/0 C. C. 0.7256 6.2 21
BRONCHITIS + ASTHMA AGE 0-17 0.4275 3.7 11
RESPIRATORY SIGNS + SYMPTOMS AGE )69 AND/OR C. C. 0.8035 5.5 26




















































DIAGNOSIS RELATED GROUPS AND SELECTED RELATIVE HEIGHTS



















































OTHER RESPIRATORY DIAGNOSES AGE >6v AND/OR C. C.
OTHER RESPIRATORY DIAGNOSES AGE (70
HEART TRANSPLANT
CARDIAC VALVE PROCEDURE WITH PUMP + WITH CARDIAC CATH
CARDIAC VALVE PROCEDURE WITH PUMP + W/0 CARDIAC CATH
CORONARY BYPASS WITH CARDIAC CATH
CORONARY BYPASS W/0 CARDIAC CATH
CARDIOTHOR PROC, EXCEPT VALVE + CORONARY BYPASS, WITH PUMP
CARDIOTHORACIC PROCEDURES W/0 PUMP
MAJOR RECONSTRUCTIVE VASCULAR PROCEDURES AGE >b9 AND/OR C. C.
MAJOR RECONSTRUCTIVE VASCULAR PROCEDURES AGE (70 W/0 C. C.
VASOLLAR PROCEDURES EXCEPT MAJOR RECONSTRUCTION
AMPUTATION FOR CIRC SYSTEM DISORDERS EXCEPT UPPER LIMB TOE
UPPER LIMB + TOE AMPUTATION FOR CIRC SYSTEM DISORDERS
PERMANENT CARDIAC PACEMAKER IMPLANT WITH AMI OR CHF
PERMANENT CARDIAC PACEMAKER IMPLANT W/0 AMI OR CHF
CARDIAC PACEMAKER REPLACE + REVIS EXC PULSEGEN REPL ONLY
CARDIAC PACEMAKER PULSE GENERATOR REPLACEMENT ONLY
VEIN LIGATION + STRIPPING
OTHER O.R. PROCEDURES ON THE CIRCULATORY SYSTEM
CIRCULATORY DISORDERS WITH AMI + C.V. COMP. DISCH. ALIVE
CIRCULATORY DISORDERS WITH AHI W/0 C.V. COMP. DISCH. ALIVE
CIRCULATORY DISORDERS WITH AMI, EXPIRED
CIRCULATORY DISORDERS EXC AMI, WITH CARD CATH + COMPLEX DIAG
CIRCULATORY DISORDERS EXC AMI, WITH CARD CATH W/0 COMPLEX DIAG
ACUTE SUBACUTE ENDOCARDITIS
HEART FAILURE + SHOCK
DEEP VEIN THROMBOPHLEBITIS
CARDIAC ARREST
PERIPHERAL VASCULAR DISORDERS AGE >69 AND/OR C. C.
PERIPHERAL VASCULAR DISORDERS AGE (70 W/0 C. C.
ATHEROSCLEROSIS AGE )69 AND/OR C. C.
ATHEROSCLEROSIS AGE (70 N/0 C. C.
HYPERTENSION
VALVULAR DISORDERS AGE )69 AND/OR C. C.
VALVULAR DISORDERS AGE 18-6" W/0 C. C.
VALVULAR DISORDERS AGE 0-17
CONDUCTION DISORDERS AGE >69 AND/OR C. C.







SYNCOPE + COLLAPSE AGE )69 AND/OR C. C.
SYNCOPE + COLLAPSE AGE (70 W/0 C. C.
CHEST PAIN
OTHER CIRCULATORY DIAGNOSES WITH C. C.
OTHER CIRCULATORY DIAGNOSES W/0 C. C.
RECTAL RESECTION AGE )69 AND/OR C. C.
RECTAL RESECTION AGE (70 W/0 C. C.
MAJOR SMALL + LARGE BOWEL PROCEDURES AGE >69 AND/OR C. C
MAJOR SMALL + LARGE BOWEL PROCEDURES AGE (70 N/0 C. C.





























































DRG HDC TYPE TITLE HEIGHT ALOS OFF
PERITONEAL ADHESIOLYSIS AGE (70 N/0 C. C. 2.0274 13.4 33
MINOR SHALL + LARGE BOWEL PROCEDURES AGE )69 AND/OR C. C. 1.4851 10.6 31
HINOR SHALL + LARGE BOWEL PROCEDURES AGE (70 H/O C. C. 1.2599 9.3 2'
STOHACH, ESOPHAGEAL DUODENAL PROCEDURES AGE >69 AND/OR C. C. 2.6901 14.8 35
STOHACH, ESOPHAGEAL + DUODENAL PROCEDURES AGE 18-69 W/(i C. C. 2.3336 13 33
STOHACH, ESOPHAGEAL + DUODENAL PROCEDURES AGE 0-17 0.847 6 20
ANAL PROCEDURES AGE >6« AND/OR C. C. 0.7985 6 25
ANAL PROCEDURES AGE (70 H/O C. C. 0.6408 5.2 1"
HERNIA PROCEDURES EXCEPT INGUINAL + FEHORAL AGE )69 AND/OR C. C. 0.9297 7.1 23
HERNIA PROCEDURES EXCEPT INGUINAL + FEMORAL AGE 18-69 H/O C. C. 0.7b7e 6 18
INGUINAL FEMORAL HERNIA PROCEDURES AGE )69 AND/OR C. C. 0.7068 5.7 16
INGUINAL + FEMORAL HERNIA PROCEDURES AGE 18-6" H/O C. C. 0.5854 4.8 12
HERNIA PROCEDURES AGE 0-17 0.4358 2.1 6
APPENDECTOMY HITH COMPLICATED PRINC. DIAG AGE>69 AND/OR C. C. 1.832 11.9 32
APPENDECTOMY HITH COMPLICATED PRINC. DIAG AGE (70 H/O C. C. 1.6154 11.3 29
APPENDECTOMY H/O COMPLICATED PRINC. DIAG AGE >69 AND/OR C. C. 1.4328 9.4 29
APPENDECTOMY H/O COMPLICATED PRINC. DIAG AGE (70 H/O C. C. 1.0818 7.4 22
PROCEDURES ON THE MOUTH AGE >65 AND/OR C.C. 0.8631 4.3 24
PROCEDURES ON THE HOUTH AGE (70 H/O C. C. 0.3992 4.2 24
OTHER DIGESTIVE SYSTEM PROCEDURES AGE >69 AND/OR C. C. 2.6602 14.6 35
OTHER DIGESTIVE SYSTEM PROCEDURES AGE (70 H/O C. C. 2.3976 13.3 33
DIGESTIVE HALIGNANCY AGE )69 AND/OR C. C. 1.2268 8.2 28
DIGESTIVE MALIGNANCY AGE (70 N/0 C. C. 1.0517 6.7 27
HEMORRHAGE AGE )69 AND/OR C. C. 0.9281 6.7 27
G.I. HEMORRHAGE AGE (70 H/O C. C. 0.8236 5.8 24
COMPLICATED PEPTIC ULCER 1.2438 8.1 28
UNCOMPLICATED FEPTIC ULCER >69 AND/OR C. C. 0.7422 6.6 24
UNCOMPLICATED PEPTIC ULCER (70 H/O C. C. 0.6141 5.5 20
INFLAMMATORY BOHEL DISEASE 1.0152 8 28
G.I. OBSTRUCTION A6E >69 AND/OR C. C. 0.8197 6.2 26
G.I. OBSTRUCTION AGE (70 H/O C. C. 0.7845 5.9 26
ESOPHAGITIS, GASTROENT, + MISC. DIGEST. DIS AGE >69 +/0R C. C. 0.6185 5.4 22
ESOPHAGITIS, GASTROENT. + MISC. DIGEST, DIS AGE 18-69 H/O C. C. 0.5652 4.8 19
ESOPHAGITIS, GASTROENTERITIS + MISC. DIGEST. DISORDERS AGE 0-17 0.3822 3.3 11
DENTAL ORAL DIS, EXC EXTRACTIONS RESTORATIONS, AGE >17 0.6681 4.2 24
DENTAL + ORAL DIS, EXC EXTRACTIONS + RESTORATIONS, AGE 0-17 0.4155 2.9 11
DENTAL EXTRACTIONS + RESTORATIONS 0.399 2.7 8
OTHER DIGESTIVE SYSTEH DIAGNOSES AGE >69 AND/OR C. C. 0.7444 5.1 25
OTHER DIGESTIVE SYSTEM DIAGNOSES AGE 18-60 w/0 C. C. 0.6576 4.5 23
OTHER DIGESTIVE SYSTEM DIAGNOSES AGE 0-17 0.3379 2.1 8
MAJOR PANCREAS, LIVER + SHUNT PROCEDURES 4.1791 20.8 41
MINOR PANCREAS, LIVER + SHUNT PROCEDURES 3.9197 20.1 40
BILIARY TRACT PROC EXC TCT CHOLECYSTECTOMY AGE >69 +/0R C. C. 2.4513 17.3 37
BILIARY TRACT PROC EXC TOT CHOLECYSTECTOMY AGE (70 H/O C. C. 1.9881 13.9 34
TOTAL CHOLECYSTECTOMY HITH C.D.E. AGE >69 AND/OR C. C. 2.169 16 36
TOTAL CHOLECYSTECTOMY HITH C.D.E. AGE (70 H/O C. C. 2.0594 15.8 36
TOTAL CHOLECYSTECTOMY H/O C.D.E. AGE >69 AND/OR C. C. 1.4868 11.5 29
TOTAL CHOLECYSTECTOMY H/O C.D.E. AGE (70 H/O C. C. 1.2752 10.1 24
HEPATOBILIARY DIAGNOSTIC PROCEDURE FOR MALIGNANCY 2.4574 17.9 38




















































DIAGNOSIS RELATED GROUPS AND SELECTED RELATIVE HEIGHTS























































OTHER HEPATOBILIARY OR PANCREAS O.R. PROCEDURES
CIRRHOSIS ALCOHOLIC HEPATITIS
MALIGNANCY OF HEPATOBILIARY SYSTEM OR PANCREAS
DISORDERS OF PANCREAS EXCEPT MALIGNANCY
DISORDERS OF LIVER EXC MALIG, CIRR, ALC HEPA AGE )69 AND/OR C. C.
DISORDERS OF LIVER EXC MALIG, CIRR, ALC HEPA AGE (70 H/0 C. C.
DISORDERS OF THE BILIARY TRACT AGE >69 AMD/OR C. C.
DISORDERS OF THE BILIARY TRACT AGE (70 H/0 C. C.
MAJOR JOINT PROCEDURES
HIP FEMUR PROCEDURES EXCEPT MAJOR JOINT AGE >69 AND/OR C. C.
HIP + FEMURE PROCEDURES EXCEPT MAJOR JOINT AGE 18-69 H/0 C. C.
HIP + FEMUR PROCEDURES EXCEPT MAJOR JOINT AGE 0-17
AMPUTATIONS FOR MUSCULOSKELETAL SYSTEM + CONN. TISSUE DISORDERS
BACi; + NECK PROCEDURES AGE /69 AND/OR C. C.
BACK + NECK PROCEDURES AGE (70 H/0 C. C.
BIOPSIES OF MUSCULOSKELETAL SYSTEM * CONNECTIVE TISSUE
HND DEBRID + SKN GRFT EXC HAND, FOR MUSCULOSKELETAL + CONN. TISS. I
LOWER EXTREM t HUHER PROC EXC HIP, FOOT, FEMUR AGE >69 +/0R C. C.
LOHER EXTREM HUMER PROC EXC HIP, FOOT, FEMUR AGE 18-69 H/0 C. C.
LOHER EXTREM + HUMER PROC EXC HIP, FOOT, FEMUR AGE 0-17
KNEE PROCEDURES AGE >69 AND/OR C. C.
KNEE PROCEDURES AGE (70 H/0 C. C.
UPPER EXTREHITY PROC EXC HUMERUS HAND AGE )69 AND/OR C. C.
UPPER EXTREMITY PROC EXC HUMERUS + HAND AGE (70 H/0 C. C.
FOOT PROCEDURES
SOFT TISSUE PROCEDURES AGE )69 AND/OR C. C.
SOFT TISSUE PROCEDURES AGE (70 H/0 C. C.
GANGLION (HAND) PROCEDURES
HAND PROCEDURES EXCEPT GANGLION
LOCAL EXCISION * REMOVAL OF INT FIX DEVICES OF HIP + FEMUR
LOCAL EXCISION + REMOVAL OF INT FIX DEVICES EXCEPT HIP + FEMUR
ARTHROSCOPY
CONN TISS O.R. PROC AGE >69 +/0R C. C.




FRACTURES OF HIP + PELVIS
SPRAINS, STRAINS, + DISLOCATIONS OF HIP, PELVIS + THIGH
OSTEOMYELITIS
PATHOLOGICAL FRACTURES * MUSCULOSKELETAL CONN. TISS. MALIGNANCY
CONNECTIVE TISSUE DISORDERS AGE )69 AND/OR C. C.
CONNECTIVE TISSUE DISORDERS AGE (70 H/0 C. C.
SEPTIC ARTHRITIS
MEDICAL BACK PROBLEMS
BONE DISEASES + SEPTIC ARTHROPATHY AGE )69 AND/OR C. C.
BONE DISEASES SEPTIC ARTHROPATHY AGE (70 H/0 C. C.
NON-SPECIFIC ARTHROPATHIES
SIGNS + SYMPTOMS OF MUSCULOSKELETAL SYSTEM CONN TISSUE
TENDONITIS, MYOSITIS + BURSITIS
AFTERCARE, MUSCULOSKELETAL SYSTEM + CONNECTIVE TISSUE




























































































































DIAGNOSIS RELATED GROUPS AND SELECTED RELATIVE WEIGHTS





251 008 M FX. SPRNS, STRNS DISL OF FOREARM, HAND, FOOT AGE 18-69 W/'O C. C.
252 008 M FX, SPRNS, STRNS + DISL OF FOREARM, HAND, FOOT AGE 0-1?
253 008 ft FX, SPRNS. STRNS + DISL OF UPARM, LOWLEG EX FOOT AGE >69 +/0R C. C.
254 008 M FX, SPRNS, STRNS + DISL OF UPARM, LOK'LEo EX FOOT AGE 18-69 W/0 C. C.
255 008 M FX, SPRNS, STRNS + DISL OF UPARM, LOWLEG EX FOOT AGE 0-17
256 008 M OTHER DIAGNOSES OF MUSCULOSKELETAL SYSTEM CONNECTIVE TISSUE
257 009 S TOTAL MASTECTOMY FOR MALIGNANCY AGE >69 AND/OR C. C.
258 009 S TOTAL MASTECTOMY FOR MALIGNANCY AGE (70 W/0 C. C.
259 009 S SUBTOTAL MASTECTOMY FOR MALIGNANCY AGE >69 AND/OR C. C.
260 009 S SUBTOTAL MASTECTOMY FOR MALIGNANCY AGE (70
261 009 S BREAST PROC FOP NON-MALIG EXCEPT BIOPSY + LOC EXC
262 009 S BREAST BIOPSY + LOCAL EXCISION FOR NON-MALIGNANCY
263 00* S SKIN GRAFTS FOR SKIN ULCER OR CELLULITIS AGE >69 AND/OR C. C.
264 00? S SKIN GRAFTS FOR SKIN ULCER OR CELLULITIS AGE (70 W/0 C. C.
265 00« S SKIN GRAFTS EXCEPT FOR SKIN ULCER OR CELLULITIS WITH C. C.
266 00'J S SKIN GRAFTS EXCEPT FOR SKIN ULCER OR CELLULITIS W/0 C. C.
267 009 S PERIANAL PILONICAL PROCEDURES
268 009 S SKIN, SUBCUTANEOUS TISSUE + BREAST PLASTIC PROCEDURES
269 009 S OTHER SKIN, SUBCUT TISS + BREAST O.R. PROC AGE >69 +/0R C. C.
270 009 S OTH SKIN, SUBCUT TISS + BREAST O.R. PROC AGE (70 W/0 C. C.
271 009 M SKIN ULCERS
272 009 H MAJOR SKIN DISORDERS AGE >69 AND/OR C. C.
273 009 M MAJOR SKIN DISORDERS AGE (70 W/0 C. C.
274 009 M MALIGNANT BREAST DISORDERS AGE >69 AND/OR C. C.
275 009 M MALIGNANT BREAST DISORDERS AGE (70 W/0 C. C.
276 009 M NON-MALIGNANT BREAST DISORDERS
277 009 M CELLULITIS AGE >69 AND/OR C. C.
278 009 H CELLULITIS AGE 18-69 W/0 C. C.
279 009 M CELLULITIS AGE 0-17
280 009 H TRAUMA TO THE SKIN, SUBCUT TISS +
281 009 M TRAUMA TO THE SKIN, SUBCUT TISS +
282 009 M TRAUMA TO THE SKIN, SUBCUT TISS +
233 009 M MINOR SKIN DISORDERS AGE >69 AND/OR C. C.
284 009 M MINOR SKIN DISORDERS AGE (70 W/0 C. C.
285 010 S AMPUTATIONS FOR ENDOCRINE, NUTRITIONAL METABOLIC DISORDERS
286 010 S ADRENAL + PITUITARY PROCEDURES
287 010 S SKIN GRAFTS + WOUND DEBRIDE FOR ENDOC, NUTRIT + METAB DISORDERS
288 010 S C.R. PROCEDURES FOR OBESITY
289 010 S PARATHYROID PROCEDURES
290 010 S THYROID PROCEDURES
291 010 S THYROGLOSSAL PROCEDURES
292 010 S OTHER ENDOCRINE, NUTRIT +
293 010 S OTHER ENDOCRINE, NUTRIT +
294 010 M DIABETES AGE = >36
295 010 M DIABETES AGE 0-35
296 010 M NUTRITIONAL + MISC. METABOLIC DISORDERS AGE >69 AND/OR C. C.
297 010 H NUTRITIONAL + MISC. METABOLIC DISORDERS AGE 18-69 W/0 C. C.
298 010 H NUTRITIONAL + MISC. METABOLIC DISORDERS AGE 0-17
299 010 M INBORN ERRORS OF METABOLISM
300 010 M ENDOCRINE DISORDERS AGE )69 AND/OR C. C.
BREAST AGE >69 +/0R C. C.
BREAST AGE 18-69 W/0 C. C.
BREAST AGE 0-17
METAB O.R. PROC AGE )69 + OR C. C.















































































































































DIAGNOSIS RELATED GROUPS AND SELECTED RELATIVE WEIGHTS
DRG MDC TYPE TITLE
301 010 M ENDOCRINE DISORDERS AGE (70 W/0 C. C.
302 Oil S KIDNEY TRANSPLANT
303 Oil S KIDNEY, URETER + MAJOR BLADDER PROCEDURE FOR NEOPLASM
304 Oil S KIDNEY, URETER + HAJ BLDRPROC FOR NON-MALIG AGE >69 +/0R C. C.
305 Oil S KIDNEY, URETER HAJ BLDR PROC FOR NON-MALIG (70 W/0 C. C.
306 Oil S PROSTATECTOMY AGE >69 AND/OR C. C.
307 Oil S PROSTATECTOMY AGE (70 W/0 C. C.
308 Oil S HINOR BLADDER PROCEDURES AGE >69 AND/OR C. C.
309 Oil S MINOR BLADDER PROCEDURES AGE (70 W/0 C. C.
310 Oil S TRANSURETHRAL PROCEDURES AGE >69 AND/OR C. C.
311 Oil S TRANSURETHRAL PROCEDURES AGE (70 W/0 C. C.
312 Oil S URETHRAL PROCEDURES, AGE >6" AND/OR C. C.
313 Oil S URETHRAL PROCEDURES, AGE 18*6? W/0 C. C.
314 Oil S URETHRAL PROCEDURES, AGE 0-17
315 Oil S OTHER KIDNEY + URINARY TRACT O.R. PROCEDURES
316 Oil M RENAL FAILURE
317 Oil M ADMIT FOR RENAL DIALYSIS
318 Oil M KIDNEY + URINARY TRACT NEOPLASMS AGE >69 AND/OR C. C.
319 Oil M KIDNEY + URINARY TRACT NEOPLASMS AGE (70 W/0 C. C.
320 Oil M KIDNEY + URINARY TRACT INFECTIONS AGE >6<< AND/OR C. C.
321 Oil M KIDNEY + URINARY TRACT INFECTIONS AGE 18-69 W/0 C. C.
322 Oil M KIDNEY + URINARY TRACTINFECTIONS AGE 0-17
323 Oil M URINARY STONES AGE >69 AND/OR C. C.
324 Oil M URINARY STONES AGE (70 W/0 C. C.
325 Oil H KIDNEY + URINARY TRACT SIGNS + SYMPTOMS AGE>69 AND/OR C. C.
326 Oil M KIDNEY URINARY TRACT SIGNS + SYHPTOMS AGE 18-69 W/0 C. C.
327 Oil M KIDNEY + URINARY TRACT SIGNS + SYMPTOMS AGE 0-17
328 Oil M URETHRAL STRICTURE AGE >69 ND/OR C. C.
329 Oil M URETHRAL STRICTURE AGE 18-65 W/0 C. C.
330 Oil M URETHRAL STRICTURE AGE 0-17
331 Oil H OTHER KIDNEY + URINARY TRACT DIAGNOSES AGE >69 AND/OR C. C.
332 Oil M OTHER KIDNEY + URINARY TRACT DIAGNOSES AGE 18-69 W/0 C. C.
333 Oil H OTHER KIDNEY + URINARY TRACT DIAGNOSES AGE 0-17
334 012 S MAJOR MALE PELVIC PROCEDURES WITH C. C.
335 012 S MAJOR MALE PELVIC PROCEDURES W/0 C. C.
336 012 S TRANSURETHRAL PROSTATECTOMY AGE >6« AND/OR C. C.
337 012 S TRANSURETHRAL PROSTATECTOMY AGE (70 W/0 C. C.
338 012 S TESTES PROCEDURES, FOR MALIGNANCY
339 012 S TESTES PROCEDURES, NON-MALIGNANT AGE >17
340 012 S TESTES PROCEDURES, NON-MALIGNANT AGE 0-17
341 012 S PENIS PROCEDURES
342 012 S CIRCUMCISION AGE )17
343 012 S CIRCUMCISION AGE 0-17
344 012 S OTHER MALE REPRODUCTIVE SYSTEM O.R. PROCEDURES FOR MALIGNANCY
345 012 S OTHER MALE REPRODUCTIVE SYSTEM O.R. PROC EXCEPT FOR MALIG
346 012 M MALIGNANCY, MALE REPRODUCTIVE SYSTEM, AGE >69 AND/OR C. C.
347 012 M MALIGNANCY, MALE REPRODUCTIVE SYSTEM, AGE (70 W/0 C. C.
348 012 M BENIGN PROSTATIC HYPERTROPHY AGE >69 AND/OR C. C.
349 012 M BENIGN PROSTATIC HYPERTROPHY AGE (70 W/0 C. C.
























































DIAGNOSIS RELATED GROUPS AND SELECTED RELATIVE WEIGHTS





351 012 M STERILIZATION, MALE 0.2655 1.3 3
352 012 M OTHER HALE REPRODUCTIVE SYSTEM DIAGNOSES 0.6385 4.4 20
353 013 S PELVIC EVISCERATION, RADICAL HYSTERECTOMY + VULVECTOMY 1.9376 12.4 32
354 013 S NON-RADICAL HYSTERECTOMY AGE >69 AND/OR C. C. 1.1108 ".6 20
355 013 S NON-RADICAL HYSTERECTOMY AGE (70 W/0 C. C. 1.0156 8.8 17
356 013 S FEMALE REPRODUCTIVE SYSTEM RECONSTRUCTIVE PROCEDURES 0.846 8.1 18
357 013 S UTERUS + ADENEXA PROCEDURES, FOR HALIGNANCY 1.9188 13.
9
34
358 013 S UTERUS + ADENEXA PROC FOR NON-MALIGNANCY EXCEPT TUBAL INTERRUPT 1.089 8 218
359 013 S TUBAL INTERRUPTION FOR NON-MALIGNANCY 0.4279 2.3 7
360 013 S VAGINA, CERVIC + VULVA PROCEDURES 0.5985 4.2 1"
361 013 S LAPAROSCOPY t ENDOSCOPY (FEMALE) EXCEPT TUBAL INTERRUPTION 0.4864 2.6 10
362 013 S LAPAROSCOPIC TUBAL INTERRUPTION 0.312b 1.4 3
3o3 013 S D + C, CONIZATION + RADIO-IMPLNT, FOR MALIGNANCY 0.6516 4.3 18
364 013 S D+C, CONIZATION EXCEPT FOR MALIGNANCY 0.4028 2.6 9
365 013 S OTHER FEMALE REPRODUCTIVE SYSTEM O.E. PROCEDURES 1.7965 12.7 33
366 013 M MALIGNANCY, FEMALE REPRODUCTIVE SYSTEM AGE J69 AND/OR C. C. 0.8444 5.2 25
367 013 M MALIGNANCY, FEMALE REPRODUCTIVE SYSTEM AGE (70 W/0 C. C. 0.5786 3.5 24
368 013 M INFECTIONS, FEMALE REPRODUCTIVE SYSTEM 0.7944 6.7 27
369 013 M MENSTRUAL * OTHER FEMALE REPRODUCTIVE SYSTEM DISORDERS 0.6959 5.1 25
370 014 S CESAREAN SECTION WITH C. C. 0.9912 7.6 15
371 014 S CESAREAN SECTION H/0 C. C. 0.7535 6.1 10
372 014 M VAGINAL DELIVERY WITH COMPLICATING DIAGNOSES 0.5534 3.8 9
373 014 M VAGINAL DELIVERY W/0 COMPLICATING DIAGNOSES 0.4063 3.2 9
374 014 S VAGINAL DELIVERY KITH STERILIZATION AND/OR D+C 0.5492 3.6 7
375 014 S VAGINAL DELIVERY WITH O.R. PROC EXCEPT STERIL AND/OR D+C 0.6389 4.4 15
376 014 M POSTPARTUM DIAGNOSES W/0 O.R. PROCEDURE 0.4158 2.9 10
377 014 S POSTPARTUM DIAGNOSES WITH O.R. PROCEDURE 0.4761 2.2 8
378 014 M ECTOPIC PREGNANCY 0.8094 5.5 11
379 014 M THREATENED ABORTION 0.3169 2.2 8
380 014 M ABORTION W/0 D+C 0.2705 1.5 4
381 014 M ABORTION WITH D+C 0.3602 1.4 4
382 014 M FALSE LABOR 0.1842 1.2 2
383 014 M OTHER ANTEPARTUM DIAGNOSES WITH MEDICAL COMPLICATIONS 0.4317 3.4 14
384 014 H OTHER ANTEPARTUM DIAGNOSES W/0 MEDICAL COMPLICATIONS 0.3245 2.2 9
385 015 NEONATES, DIED OR TRANSFERRED 0.6883 1.8 14
386 015 EXTREME IMMATURITY, NEONATE 3.6863 17.9 38
337 015 PREMATURITY WITH MAJOR PROBLEMS 1.8459 13.3 33
388 015 PREMATURITY W/0 MAJOR PROBLEMS 1.1693 8.6 29
38° 015 FULL TERM NEONATE WITH MAJOR PROBLEMS 0.5482 4.7 16
390 015 NEONATES WITH OTHER SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS 0.3523 3.4 9
391 015 NORMAL NEWBORNS 0.2241 3.1 7
392 016 S SPLENECTOMY AGE )17 2.7746 16.4 36
393 016 S SPLENECTOMY AGE 0-17 1.5366 9.1 29
394 016 S OTHER O.R. PROCEDURES OF THE BLOOD + BLOOD FORMING ORGANS 1.1146 6.1 26
395 016 M RED BLOOD CELL DISORDERS AGE )17 0.7839 6.1 26
396 016 M RED BLOOD CELL DISORDERS AGE 0-17 0.6295 4.1 18
397 016 M COAGULATION DISORDERS 0.9863 6.7 27
398 016 H RETICULOENDOTHELIAL + IMMUNITY DISORDERS AGE M AND/OR C. C. 0.89 6.1 26
399 016 M RETICULOENDOTHELIAL + IMMUNITY DISORDERS AGE (70 W/0 C. C. 0.8459 5.6 26
400 017 S LYMPHOMA OR LEUKEHIA WITH MAJOR O.R. PROCEDURE 2.8272 16.9 37
187
DIAGNOSIS RELATED GROUPS AND SELECTED RELATIVE HEIGHTS
DRG MDC TYPE TITLE
401 017 S LYMPHOMA OR LEUKEMIA WITH MINOR O.R. PROC AGE >69 AND/OR C. C.
402 017 S LYMPHOMA OR LEUKEMIA WITH MINOR O.R. PROCEDURE AGE (70 W/0 C. C
403 017 M LYMPHOMA OR LEUKEMIA AGE >69 AND/OR C. C.
404 017 M LYMPHOMA OR LEUKEMIA AGE 18-6"» H/0 C. C.
405 017 M LYMPHOMA OR LEUKEMIA AGE 0-17
406 017 S MYELOPROLIF DISORD OR POORLY DIFF NEOPLASM H MAJ O.R. PROC + C
407 017 S MYELOPROLIF DISORD OR POORLY DIFF NEOPL H MAJ O.R. PROC H/0 C.
408 017 S MYELOPROLIF DISORD OR POORLY DIFF NEOPL HITH MINOR O.R. PROC
409 017 M RADIOTHERAPY
410 017 H CHEMOTHERAPY
411 017 M HISTORY OF MALIGNANCY H/0 ENDOSCOPY
412 017 M HISTORY OF MALIGNANCY HITH ENDOSCOPY
413 017 H OTHER MYELOPROLIF DISORD OR POORLY DIFF NEOPL DX AGE/69 t/OR C. C.
414 017 M OTHR MYELOPROLIF DISORD OR POORLY DIFF NEOPL DX AGE(70 H/0 C. C
415 018 S O.R. PROCEDURE FOR INFECTIONS + PARASITIC DISEASES
416 018 N SEPTECEMIA AGE )17
417 01S M SEPTECEMIA AGE 0-17
418 018 M POSTOPERATIVE + POST-TRAUMATIC INFECTIONS
419 013 M FEVER OF UNKNOWN ORIGIN AGE >65 AND/OR C. C.
420 018 H FEVER OF UNKNOWN ORIGIN AGE 18-69 W/0 C. C.
421 018 M VIRAL ILLNESS AGE >17
422 018 M VIRAL ILLNESS FEVER OF UNKNOWN ORIGIN AGE 0-17
423 018 M OTHER INFECTIOUS + PARASITIC DISEASES DIAGNOSES
424 019 S O.R. PROCEDURES HITH PRINCIPAL DIAGNOSIS OF MENTAL ILLNESS
425 019 M ACUTE ADJUST REACT t DISTURBANCES OF PSYCHOSOCIAL DYSFUNCTION
426 019 M DEPRESSIVE NEUROSES
427 019 N NEUROSES EXCEPT DEPRESSIVE
428 019 M DISORDERS OF PERSONALITY + IMPULSE CONTROL
429 019 M ORGANIC DISTURBANCES + MENTAL RETARDATION
430 019 M PSYCHOSES
431 019 M CHILDHOOD MENTAL DISORDERS
432 019 M OTHER DIAGNOSES OF MENTAL DISORDERS
433 020 SUBSTANCE USE SUEST INDUCED ORGANIC MENTAL DISORDERS, LEFT AMA
434 020 DRUG DEPENDENCE
435 020 DRUG USE EXCEPT DEPENDENCE
436 020 ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE
437 020 ALCOHOL USE EXCEPT DEPENDENCE
438 020 ALCOHOL + SUBSTANCE INDUCED ORGANIC HENTAL SYNDROHE
439 021 S SKIN GRAFTS FOR INJURIES
440 021 S HOUND DEBRIGEMENTS FOR INJURIES
441 021 S HAND PROCEDURES FOR INJURIES
442 021 S OTHER O.R. PROCEDURES FOR INJURIES AGE >69 AND/OR C. C.
443 021 S OTHER O.R. PROCEDURES FOR INJURIES AGE (70 W/0 C. C.
444 021 M MULTIPLE TRAUMA AGE >69 AND/OR C. C.
445 021 M MULTIPLE TRAUMA AGE 18-65 W/0 C. C.
446 021 M MULTIPLE TRAUMA AGE 0-17
447 021 M ALLERGIC REACTIONS AGE )17
448 021 M ALLERGIC REACTIONS AGE 0-17
44* 021 M TOXIC EFFECTS OF DRUGS AGE >69 AND/OR C. C.











C. 2.2671 15 35


















































DRG MDC TYPE TITLE HEIGHT ALOS OFF
TOXIC EFFECTS OF DRUGS AGE 0-1? 0.2°12 2.1 8
COMPLICATIONS OF TREATMENT AGE W AND/OR C. C. 0.S492 5.5 2*
COMPLICATIONS OF TREATMENT AGE (70 H/0 C. C. 0.°02 5.1 25
OTHER INJURIES, POISONINGS + TOXIC EFFDIAG AGE >69 AND/OR C. C. 0.8224 5.3 25
OTHER INJURIES, POISONINGS + TOXIC EFF DIAG AGE (70 H/0 C. C. 0.6185 3.5 22
BURNS, TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER ACUTE CARE FACILITY 2.0902 11.6 32
EXTENSIVE BURNS 6.8631 12.6 33
NON-EXTENSIVE BURNS WITH SKIN GRAFTS 2.8572 18.3 38
NON-EXTENSIVE BURNS HITH HOUND DEBRIDEMENT + OTHER O.R. PROC 2.7568 12.7 33
NON-EXTENSIVE BURNS H/0 O.R. PROCEDURE 1.4225 9 2?
O.R. PROC HITH DIAGNOSES OF OTHER CONTACT WITH HEALTH SERVICES 1.6507 8 28
REHABILITATION 1.8268 13.5 34
SIGNS * SYMPTOMS WITH C. C. 0.7702 6.3 26
SIGNS * SYMPTOMS H/0 C. C. 0.7322 6 26
AFTERCARE WITH HISTORY OF MALIGNANCY AS SECONDARY DX 0.2071 1.5 4
AFTERCARE W/0 HISTORY OF MALIGNANCY AS SECONDARY DX 0.6377 3.7 24
OTHER FACTORS INFLUENCING HEALTH STATUS 0.9799 6.1 26
UNRELATED OR PROCEDURE 2.1037 11.2 31
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CONSOLIDATED FY83 AND FY84 MEPR EXPENSE AND WORKLOAD DATA
MEPR INPATIENT EXPENSES AND DISPOSITIONS
INPATIENT CARE CHARLESTON LONG BEACH PENSACOLA
FY84 EXPENSES $14,929,978 $15,041,916 $10,093,468
FY84 DISPOSITIONS 12,856 9,436 7,237




PHYSICIAN SALARIES $14,236,442 $14,279,354
FY83 EXPENSES(ACT) $13,784,155 $14,822,302 $9,704,460
FY83 EXPENSES(ADJ) $15,024,729 $16,156,309 $10,577,861
FY83 DISPOSITIONS 13,024 9,341 6,998
FY83 ALOS 4.3 4.4 5.0
FY83 PHYSICIAN(ACT)
SALARIES $691,179 $909,556 $670,086
FY83 PHYSICIAN(ADJ)
SALARIES $753,385 $991,416 $730,394
FY83 EXPENSES(ADJ)
(less) PHYSICIAN
SALARIES $14,271 ,343 $15,164,893 $9,847,468
222
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